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As the saying goes, “A penny saved is a penny earned,” but does that penny saved
translate into greater economic mobility? Movement up the income ladder is fairly
limited for children of low-income parents—42 percent of children born to parents 
on the bottom rung of the income ladder remain on the bottom rung a generation later.i
To date, however, there has been less analysis that shows clearly how income mobility
differs based on one’s own or one’s parents’ level of savings. This paper clearly
demonstrates the relationship between savings and economic mobility.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the paper first explores
whether having parents with high savings (i.e., above median savings) or having high
savings oneself, improves one’s chances of making the climb up the income ladder, 
or prevents one from falling down it. Second, it examines federal incentives and
disincentives to savings in the federal tax code and public assistance programs. 
And third, consistent with the project’s recently released nonpartisan policy road 
map to enhance mobility, it makes recommendations on ways public policy can be
improved to encourage savings, especially among low- and moderate-income families. 
Children of low-income, high-saving parents are more likely to experience
upward income mobility.
• Children of low-saving (i.e., below median), low-income parents are significantly
less likely to be upwardly mobile than children of high-saving, low-income parents.
• Seventy-one percent of children born to high-saving, low-income parents move up
from the bottom income quartile over a generation, compared to only 50 percent of
children of low-saving, low-income parents. 
Higher personal savings also promotes greater upward mobility of individuals
within their own lifetimes.
• Among adults who were in the bottom income quartile from 1984-1989, 34 percent
left the bottom by 2003-2005 if their initial savings were low, compared with 55
percent who left the bottom if their initial savings were high. 
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At the top of the income ladder, savings rates are not necessarily a good
predictor of downward mobility.
• Children of high-saving, high-income parents are no less likely to move down the
income ladder than children of low-saving, high-income parents. 
- Forty-five percent whose parents had high savings remained on the top income
rung as adults versus 39 percent whose parents had low savings. 
• Similarly, adults who started out with incomes in the top quartile were equally likely
to remain in the top income quartile 15 to 20 years later regardless of whether they
had high savings (63 percent still at the top) or low savings (60 percent still at the top).
The federal government has in place a suite of tax policies and specially-
designated accounts that promote savings. 
• It is estimated that the federal government will devote almost $130 billion in 
FY 2010 to incentivize contributions to retirement, health, and education savings
vehicles, the overwhelming majority of which ($126 billion) are associated with
retirement.
Very little of the benefits from federal savings vehicles go to low-income
households.
• As an example, in 2004, among those participating in retirement plans, those 
in the lowest income quintile received just 0.2 percent of the federal tax benefits 
(an average of $6 per tax filer), while those in the highest income quintile received
70 percent of the benefits (an average of $1,838 per tax filer).
Asset limits in public assistance programs discourage savings among low- and
moderate-income families—those whose economic mobility is most likely 
to benefit from personal savings.
• Asset limits vary widely across programs and, in some cases, within programs,
especially for those that allow states to set their own eligibility criteria.
Consistent with the Economic Mobility Project’s nonpartisan policy road map, 
the paper encourages policymakers to remove disincentives to savings in public
assistance programs and to encourage savings via the tax code particularly 
for low-income Americans. 
i Isaacs, Haskins, and Sawhill, 2007.
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A previous Economic Mobility Project report, Pathways to Economic Mobility, 
noted that “one of the keys to economic mobility is saving and creating wealth that 
can be used during one’s working life to advance up the economic ladder or be given 
to children to improve their economic prospects.” Through savings, parents can help
children pay for higher education and other mobility-enhancing investments and also
may be able to prevent their children from experiencing downward mobility when
unexpected problems arise. Similarly, adults who save may be better situated to
improve their own upward mobility. In other words, not only is a penny saved a 
penny earned, a penny saved is mobility earned.
Despite the importance of savings, most Americans, particularly those with lower
incomes, appear not to be saving a lot. A recent survey by the Consumer Federation 
of America found that 64 percent of households with incomes under $25,000 have less
than $500 in emergency savings; for households with incomes between $25,000 and
$50,000, 38 percent have less than $500 available.1 Furthermore, data collected by the
Federal Reserve indicate that for households in the bottom two income quintiles, the
median value of savings held in a transaction account in 2007 was reported to be $800
and $1,600, respectively, essentially unchanged from 2004 and down from 2001 levels
($1,000 and $2,100 respectively).2 The recent economic downturn has depleted the
savings of many families even further, necessitating a closer look at the ways in which
federal policies create obstacles to increased savings that must be overcome.
A Penny Saved is Mobility Earned describes how savings and mobility are related 
and ways in which public policy can be improved to encourage Americans to save 
more and, thereby, improve their prospects for upward mobility. To examine households’
economic mobility and the extent to which savings facilitates it, Chapter 1 presents
analysis by Daniel Cooper and Maria Luengo-Prado drawing on data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).3 Chapters 2 and 3, by Reid Cramer and 
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Rourke O’Brien, explore the ways in which the federal tax code and means-tested
public assistance programs do or do not promote savings. Given their analysis, in 
Chapter 4, Cramer and O’Brien present a range of recommendations for policymakers 
to consider that will encourage Americans to save and build assets, thereby improving
their ability to climb the income ladder. 
The report argues that savings are particularly important for those at the bottom of the
ladder and there are important ways that public policies fail to encourage these families
to save. While the federal government spends hundreds of billions of dollars every year
to promote savings, these outlays are heavily skewed toward moderate- and upper-income
households—families that are able to accumulate relatively large savings regardless of
such programs. Programs such as employer-sponsored savings plans and complex systems
of savings options are often inaccessible to low-income Americans and, therefore, this
population fails to benefit from the existing tax incentives. Further, the rules that
govern federally supported, means-tested programs impose limits on the amount of
savings or assets a family can hold and still qualify for benefits. These rules and their
implementation at the state and local level have served to discourage savings among
those who would benefit the most, making the path to self-sufficiency and economic
mobility more difficult. Considering this data, the report suggests a number of policy
changes that would help more Americans, and their children, climb the income ladder
through savings.
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The Economic Mobility Project has previously established the strong role that parental
income plays in influencing one’s prospects for economic mobility. Movement up the
income ladder is fairly limited for children of low-income parents—42 percent of
children born to parents on the bottom rung of the income ladder remain on the
bottom rung a generation later.4 To date, there has been less analysis of savings and
income data that shows clearly how income mobility differs based on one’s own or 
one’s parents’ level of savings. In other words, does having parents with greater savings,
or having greater savings oneself, improve one’s chances of making the climb up the
income ladder or prevent one from falling down the income ladder?
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this chapter explores the relationship
of savings to income mobility in greater detail, tracking over generations whether parents
having relatively high or low savings impacts where in the income distribution their children
will end up as adults. It also explores this question for individuals over a twenty-year
period (i.e., intragenerationally). The analyses show that both having parents with a higher
level of savings and having a higher level of savings oneself significantly increases 
one’s chances of making the climb up the income ladder, particularly for low-income
individuals and families. However, it appears that a higher level of savings does not
have a substantial impact on the chances of experiencing downward mobility. 
MEASURING SAVINGS AND INCOME MOBILITY
The PSID is advantageous for this research because it tracks households and their
offspring starting in 1968. The analysis in this chapter includes data through 2005.5
The PSID contains detailed information on households’ financial asset holdings as part
of wealth supplements in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 onwards. The financial assets
and liabilities surveyed include cash and bond holdings, stock holdings, real estate assets,
other real estate holdings, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and pension accounts,
farms and businesses, vehicles, and non-collateralized debt (which is viewed as dis-saving).6
The measure of “savings” used in this report includes households’ financial wealth, but
excludes any housing equity in a household’s primary residence. In other words, “savings”
can be thought of as non-housing wealth. Housing is a unique asset because it both
satisfies families’ need for shelter and serves as an investment vehicle.7 A future report
from the Economic Mobility Project will examine the particular role of homeownership
and housing wealth in facilitating economic mobility.
CHAPTER 1
SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY
Daniel Cooper and Maria Luengo-Prado
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This chapter compares households’ income in the second half of the 1980s with their
income in the first half of the current decade. Given the representative nature of the
PSID, the age of the household heads in the sample varies greatly. As a result, household
income is adjusted to control for differences based solely on head of household’s age
before ranking households within the income distribution.8 Households are then ranked
based on the average of their 1984 and 1989 incomes and divided into four equally
sized groups, or quartiles.9 The same approach is followed for households’ 2003 and
2005 incomes. The intergenerational results compare parents’ income in the earlier
period with that of their adult children in the more recent period. To maximize the
number of households in the analyses, all available adult children are examined,
regardless of whether they lived with a parent in 1984–1989. The intragenerational
analyses compare a given household’s economic status in 1984–1989 with its status 
in 2003–2005. Because the wealth supplements began only in 1984, the analyses are
confined to these years.
To determine whether income mobility is related to initial savings levels, these analyses
were also conducted after splitting families into “low-savings” and “high-savings” groups.
The low-savings group has savings in the bottom half of all families (i.e., below median
savings); the high-savings group has savings that put them in the top half of families
(i.e., above median savings). The cut-off separating the bottom and top halves is equal
to roughly $38,000 in the intergenerational mobility analyses and $30,700 in the
intragenerational mobility analyses (in 2000 dollars).
Consistent with previous research by the Economic Mobility Project, we find
limited income mobility from the bottom and top rungs of the income ladder.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows where adults who started out in different quartiles
based on their parents’ income ended up as adults. The right panel shows how adults’
positions changed from the 1984–1989 period to the 2003–2005 period. Among those
whose parents were in the bottom quartile (who had about $23,700 in 2000 dollars 
average), 42 percent remained in the bottom as adults (earning an average income 
of about $18,400 in 2000 dollars). Similarly, 44 percent of those who started out in 
the top quartile (whose parents earned $116,800 on average) were also themselves 
at the top as adults (earning $125,200 on average). In contrast, the chances of rising
from the bottom to the top or falling from the top to the bottom were low, with just 13
and 14 percent respectively, experiencing such a large change in income. These patterns
typify a phenomenon previously identified in research by EMP and others—“stickiness”
at the bottom and top of the income distribution that limits mobility.
Intragenerational mobility is characterized by even more stickiness. Looking at incomes
over 15 to 20 years of a person’s adulthood, we find that mobility is even more limited
than it is across generations. Fully 61 percent of those whose own income put them in
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the bottom quartile from 1984–1989 ($22,300 average income) remained there from
2003–2005 ($21,100 on average). About the same proportion (63 percent) of those
whose own income put them in the top quartile ($110,700 on average) were still there
in 2003–2005 ($139,800 on average). In contrast, very few households fell from the
top income quartile to the bottom quartile or rose from the bottom to the top.
FIGURE 1
Income Mobility is Limited at the Top and Bottom of the Income Ladder
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Across generations having greater savings increases the chances one 
will experience upward income mobility from the bottom of the income ladder,
but does not necessarily decrease downward mobility from the top.
Intergenerational income mobility varies depending on how much savings parents have.
Fully 50 percent of Americans starting out in the bottom income quartile remained there
as adults if their parents had low savings levels (see Figure 2). However, if their parents
had high savings levels, just 29 percent of children remained in the bottom income quartile
as adults. Since 25 percent would remain in the bottom if there was perfect income mobility,
this difference is fairly sizable.
On the other hand, parental saving is not necessarily associated with downward income
mobility from the top. Among those whose parents had high savings, 45 percent of
children who started in the top income quartile remained there as adults; 39 percent
did if their parents had low savings. This stickiness at the top regardless of parental
savings is not surprising. Parents in the top income quartile are more likely than
parents in the bottom to have other assets aside from savings that they can leverage 
to support their children’s upward income mobility. 
Starting Income Quartile (1984–1989)
E
nding Incom
e Q
uartile
(2003–2005)
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Within one’s lifetime, having greater savings also increases the chances 
of experiencing upward income mobility from the bottom of the income ladder.
Figure 3 shows that among adults who were in the bottom income quartile in 1984–1989,
66 percent remained there in 2003–2005 if their initial savings were low, compared
with 45 percent who remained at the bottom if their initial savings were high. Once
again, however, initial savings appear unrelated to downward income mobility from the
top. While 63 percent of those who started out with incomes in the top quartile and with
high savings remained in the top income quartile 15 to 20 years later, 60 percent of those
who started out with incomes in the top quartile and low savings did as well.
FIGURE 2 Parental Savings are Associated with Greater Upward Income Mobility 
but Not Less Downward Mobility 
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FIGURE 3 A Person’s Own Initial Savings are Associated with Greater Upward Income Mobility 
but Not Less Downward Mobility 
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CONCLUSION
It is clear from the analysis presented here that people who have higher savings
experience greater upward mobility. In particular, the results show that savings is
potentially an important factor in advancing one’s children and oneself up the income
ladder, especially for those households who start at the bottom of the income distribution.
By facilitating investment in children, for example, families that save can boost their
human capital and promote their economic success. 
Savings appear to be less important in preventing downward mobility from the top, either
across generations or over the span of a person’s own working years, possibly because
other assets take the place of savings to serve as a buffer against downward mobility.
Using public policy to promote savings, then, would appear to be a potentially beneficial
strategy for enhancing upward economic mobility, especially among low-income families
and households. The remaining chapters discuss ways in which existing policy fails to
do so and how it could be improved to open up the American Dream to more people.
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The vast majority of federal incentives to increase ownership and savings, estimated 
to exceed $360 billion in 2010, are delivered though the tax code as tax expenditures,
and mostly claimed by wealthier households.10 This chapter scrutinizes the use of tax
incentives to encourage savings, both in general and for households with lower incomes
and fewer resources. Even though this population has diverse characteristics in terms 
of age, family structure, and relationship to the workforce, as a group their economic
security and potential for economic mobility would benefit from increased savings.
Without access to supportive policies to promote savings, many households miss out 
on the potential boost that savings can supply to their mobility. 
Over time, the U.S. tax code has been amended with the explicit purpose of increasing
personal savings. Beginning in 1974, Congress created IRAs, which allow individuals 
to defer paying taxes on any capital gains and dividends that build up in their accounts
until after they retire. In 1978, Congress followed through with the creation of the first
401(k) plans, which also offer tax-deferred retirement savings but are established by
employers on behalf of their employees. The two programs did not attract much attention
until the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 which expanded the tax-saving benefits
associated with participation. Between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, additional tax
advantages were offered to those saving for education and health care costs. 
Collectively, this suite of tax policies and specially designated accounts constitutes the
primary means by which the federal government offers support to savers. With favorable
tax treatment of deposits, significant resources are at stake through foregone revenue.11
In fact, it is estimated that the federal government will devote almost $130 billion 
in FY 2010 to incentivize contributions to these savings vehicles, the overwhelming
majority of which are associated with retirement (see Table 1). The scale of these
resources reflects the public commitment to a set of objectives related to long-term
savings, but it raises the question of whether the public is getting its money’s worth. 
Previous research has sought to address the degree of uncertainty in determining how
effective these incentives are in promoting savings.12 From this work, one thing is clear:
how these policies treat different kinds of savers varies enormously. Those who have
little or no tax liability receive little or no incentive to save. Meanwhile those with the
highest incomes receive the highest benefits, which they may use simply to shelter
CHAPTER 2
SAVINGS POLICY AND THE TAX CODE
Reid Cramer
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money that they would have saved anyway. The flip side of this is that the current 
policy structure leaves out those that might benefit from savings the most.
These policies also come with rules governing eligibility, contributions, and withdrawals.
Such restrictions may coerce some individuals into patterns of savings that are not
appropriate to their circumstances or deter them from participating at all. A lower-
income household, for example, may wind up with savings locked into an IRA that
would bring them higher benefits if the money were invested instead in purchasing 
a car to get to work, buying a home, or accessing additional education. If current policy
does not recognize this diversity of savings needs, it may unintentionally serve as a
barrier to increased saving. 
Additionally, the complexity of rules creates administrative costs and compliance
burdens that discourage some employers from offering savings plans to their workers,
undermining the policy objective of increased personal savings and undercutting 
the opportunity to promote economic mobility.13
There are a wide variety of federal savings vehicles. For the most part, 
tax incentives to induce savings come from a common mold. They involve making
deposits into specially designated financial products that are afforded special 
TABLE 1
Budget Cost of Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles (in millions of dollars) 
Retirement
FY 2010FY 2009FY 2008
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Employer Plans 46,120 45,670 44,370
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: 401(k) Plans 47,000 50,000 53,000
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: IRAs 11,700 12,700 13,500
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Saver’s Credit 890 980 1,050
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Keough Plans 12,000 13,000 14,000
Subtotal 117,710 122,350 125,920
Education
Coverdell Education Savings Account (Education IRA) 30 40 60
529 College Savings and State Prepaid Tuition Plans 1,030 1,250 1,480
Subtotal 1,060 1,290 1,540
Health
Medical Savings Accounts/Health Savings Accounts 1,830 1,930 2,030
Subtotal 1,830 1,930 2,030
TOTAL 120,600 125,570 129,490
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 2009. Table 19-1.
Notes: Budget costs are estimates of foregone revenue that would otherwise be collected by the U.S. Treasury. 
They are commonly referred to as tax expenditures.
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tax treatment, which increase the effective rate of return on savings. The tax code 
identifies the specific set of rules that govern these special accounts and savings plans. 
If resources are withdrawn for qualified purposes, this treatment is favorable; if the
withdrawals are for other purposes, penalties may be applied. (Table A1, which 
appears in the Appendix, presents a description of 15 distinct savings accounts and
plans that have been created for the explicit purpose of increasing the amount of
resources households save for the future.14) The financial resources held in these
accounts can take a variety of forms such as individual securities, savings bonds, 
and investment funds, but always require cash deposits to be put aside for a future
event, such as hospitalization, home purchase, postsecondary education, or retirement.15
The policy goal of inducing savings for specific purposes distinguishes these vehicles
from other holdings of personal savings and investments.16
The various accounts and savings plans differ from one another in many ways,
including who opens the account, when tax benefits are delivered, who is eligible to
participate, the rules that determine how contributions to the account are made, and
the rules that govern how withdrawals from the account are made. All of these issues
collectively determine the level of tax benefits that can accrue to each participant. 
(For more information on the differences between savings plans, see the box, “Variations
in Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles.”) Ultimately, it is these benefits that create the
incentive which entices or compels individuals to participate in these savings products. 
The fact that each vehicle has a unique definition of qualified uses and unique
exemptions from penalty sends a range of mixed messages about what the policy
intends to accomplish. For example, accounts and plans that are often described as
retirement vehicles have a number of other uses, such as to help pay for a first-time
home purchase, that are permissible without penalty. Although some of the public may
view the list of qualified uses as clear policy signals that define the purposes of each
account, others object that withdrawals used for other than the main or most distant
purpose divert resources and deprive the account holder of long-term investment growth. 
Limiting the qualified uses of savings accounts and plans is especially relevant for
households with fewer resources, who may need increased flexibility, both in times of
hardship and as a means to save for other assets that can pay off over the life course. 
It is constructive to consider how the collective set of tax rules serve as a foundation for
our national savings policy, and whether they are effective at achieving their goals. 
To do so, we need to examine the savings opportunities created by these tax incentives
by asking three questions: Who is participating? How much are they contributing?
How are the tax benefits distributed among the population?
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VARIATIONS IN TAX-FAVORED SAVINGS VEHICLES
Account Opening: Individual 
or Employer-Sponsore d
Tax-favored savings vehicles may be opened by either
an employer or by the individual account holder. 
The most recognized employer-sponsored plan is the
401(k) saving plan, but there are others such as the
403(b) offered by nonprofit organizations and Keough
Plans for the self-employed. With these vehicles,
employers are offered tax benefits to open and contribute
to these plans as part of their compensation benefits
package to employees. Most individuals also are able
to open tax-favored savings accounts, such as IRAs
and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). Individuals
who open IRAs can access tax benefits based on the
amount of their contributions and their incomes. 
Tax Treatment: Front-Loaded 
or Back-Loaded
Tax-favored accounts and savings plans have benefits
that are either front-loaded or back-loaded. Benefits
are front-loaded when contributions are not taxed
and earnings grow tax-free until the funds are
withdrawn or distributed. At that time, both the
contributions and earnings are taxed. Traditional 
IRA and 401(k) plans are examples of front-loaded
savings accounts. Benefits are back-loaded when
contributions are made with income that has already
been taxed, but are allowed to grow tax-free. Neither
the contributions nor earnings are taxed for qualified
withdrawals. The Roth IRA is an example of a 
back-loaded plan.17 The one savings account that 
has benefits on both ends is the HSA—pre-tax dollars
can be contributed to HSAs and untaxed withdrawals
can be made for qualified medical purposes. 
Income and Contribution Limits 
Tax-favored accounts and savings plans have rules
that determine how much money can be contributed
during a given period of time. These rules seek to
limit the use of these accounts as tax shelters and
vary by account type. For example, contributions 
to Roth IRAs are capped at $5,000 per person and 
at $6,000 if the person is 50 or over. There also are
income limits that determine if a person is eligible to
make a tax-advantaged contribution to these accounts.18
Qualified Uses
To ensure that the resources that are deposited 
and accumulated within these tax-favored savings
accounts and plans are used for sanctioned purposes,
all programs have rules that determine the tax
treatment of withdrawals. Withdrawals for qualified
purposes receive the most beneficial tax tr eatment,
while non-qualified withdrawals are penalized with
higher taxes. The qualified purposes are related to
the policy objectives conveyed by the tax rules and 
some accounts restrict the qualified purpose to 
one specific objective. For example, a Coverdell
Educational Savings Account only allows tax-free
withdrawals when the funds are used for qualified
education expenses. Accounts generally focus the 
tax benefits on withdrawals for purposes specified 
in the tax code, such as retirement security, home
purchases, or postsecondary educational expenses. 
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Participation in savings vehicles varies with age, income, and marital status.19
All persons are eligible to participate in federal savings vehicles and almost all people
are eligible to participate in savings vehicles that are afforded beneficial treatment by 
the tax code.20 Still, rates of participation vary widely across the population. 
Examining data from individual tax returns, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
assessed who contributes and how much to a variety of tax-favored savings vehicles,
including employment-based plans, self-employed plans, and IRAs as well as traditional
defined-benefit pension plans that receive favorable tax treatment for employer
contributions.21 Because this work included data from multiple years (1997, 2000, 
and 2003), the analysis considered both recent trends over time and the impact 
of legislation that changed the rules for contributions.22
The primary finding of the CBO analysis is that while almost all workers are eligible to
participate by saving in a tax-favored account or saving plan, only half actually do, as
described in Table 2.23 The breakdown among the various vehicles is revealing. In 2003,
29 percent of tax filers participated in a 401(k)-type plan, 17 percent participated in 
a defined-benefit (non-contributory) plan and 7 percent participated in an IRA (4 percent 
had a traditional IRA and 4 percent had a Roth IRA). 
The likelihood of participation was found to vary by age, income, and marital status, 
as described in Table 3. Only one-third of workers under the age of 30 participated
compared to 63 percent age 45 to 59. Participation rates for earners making over $80,000
exceeded 80 percent, but were closer to 50 percent for those with incomes between
$20,000 and $40,000 and were 20 percent for those earning less than $20,000.24
Alternatively, participation rates in defined-benefit plans (not shown) were lowest 
for those making more than $80,000 (under 17 percent), with higher rates for those
earning between $40,000 and $80,000 (21 percent) and between $20,000 and $40,000
TABLE 2 Participation in Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated 
with Retirement, 2003, by Account or Plan Type 
Number of
Workers
(in thousands)
Percentage 
Actively 
Participating
in Any Plan
401(k) Plan 40,257 29
Traditional Defined-Benefit Pension 23,937 17
Traditional IRA or Roth IRA 10,045 7
Self-Employed Plan 1,274 1
Any Pension Plan 75,513 50
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007.
Notes: Unit of analysis is existing tax filing workers, totaling 140.8 million in 2003.
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(22 percent). Higher-income workers were more than twice as likely as lower-income
workers to participate in a 401(k) type plan and in IRAs. Participation rates in IRAs
also rose with income (also not shown).25
While the participation rate was near 50 percent for all workers in 2003, according 
to data from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), the sponsorship rate 
was substantially higher (67 percent).26 This refers to the fraction of workers whose
employer or union sponsors a plan for any of the employees at the worker’s place 
of employment. When plans are offered, EBRI found that the participation rate was 
TABLE 3 Participation in Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement,
1997, 2000, 2003, by income, age cohort, and marital status 
By Age Cohort
CATEGORY
Percentage Actively 
Participating in Any Plan
Under 30 35 33 32
30 to 44 58 56 56
45 to 59 64 63 63
60 and over 42 40 44
All Cohorts 51 50 50
By Income Group
Under $20,000 21 20 20
$20,000 to $40,000 55 51 52
$40,000 to $80,000 70 67 68
$80,000 to $120,000 79 79 80
$120,000 to $160,000 81 83 82
$160,000 and over 77 79 79
All Income Groups 51 50 50
By Marital Status/Earner Role
Unmarried Earners 41 39 40
Married Earners
Sole 53 46 52
Primary 72 75 72
Secondary 54 59 57
All Earners 51 50 50
Nonearning Spouse 6 7 9
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 1997, 2000, and 2003 individual income tax
returns and tax information returns.
Notes: Participation consists of making a contribution to a 401(k)-type plan or being enrolled in a noncontributory 
plan during the given year. Workers participating in both types of plan are counted only in the 401(k)-type, so summing 
the percentages yields participation in all employment-based plans. The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus
excluded contributions to retirement plans less taxable distributions from individual retirement accounts.
200320001997
ECONOM IC  MOB I L I T Y  PRO JECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
17 A Penny Saved is Mobility Earned: Advancing Economic Mobility through Savings
also higher, exceeding 75 percent in 2003.27 Their analysis shows how these rates are
affected by a range of factors, including firm size, union status, firm sector (private or
public), education level, and income of the workforce. Employers that are larger in size,
unionized, or in the public sector have much higher sponsorship and participation rates. 
Contributions to savings vehicles increase with income. For those that participated
in savings plans, CBO was able to report employee contributions for 401(k)-type plans,
IRAs and self-employed plans.28
TABLE 4 Average Contributions to 401(k)-Type
Plans, 2003, by income, age cohort,
and marital status, in 2003 dollars
By Age Cohort
CATEGORY
2003
Average
Contribution
(2003 
dollars)
Under 30 1,951
30 to 44 3,519
45 to 59 4,469
60 and over 4,337
All Cohorts 3,716
By Income Group (1997 dollars)
Under $20,000 726
$20,000 to $40,000 1,583
$40,000 to $80,000 3,162
$80,000 to $120,000 5,287
$120,000 to $160,000 7,476
$160,000 and over 9,503
All Income Groups 3,716
By Marital Status/Earner Role
Unmarried Earners 2,891
Married Earners 
Sole 4,787
Primary 4,550
Secondary 3,105
All Earners 3,716
Nonearning Spouse n.a.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 1997,
2000, and 2003 individual income tax returns and tax information returns.
Notes: The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus excluded
contributions to retirement plans less taxable distributions from individual
retirement accounts. Income group bands calculated in 1997 dollars.
n.a. = not applicable.
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For 401(k)-type plans, higher-income earners made substantially higher contributions
(see Table 4). The average contribution of workers with incomes between $120,000
and $160,000 was $7,476 in 2003, which was more than double that of workers earning
between $40,000 and $80,000, who made contributions of $3,162 on average. Those
earning between $20,000 and $40,000 had contributions of $1,583. 
Most benefits from federal savings vehicles go to upper-income households.
As previous research for the Economic Mobility Project has found, the federal government
spent $746 billion in 2006 on mobility expenditures, but only 1.6 percent ($205
billion) of these expenditures went to lower-income households.29 Further, while the
government invested $104 billion on savings and investment incentives, virtually the
entire amount was distributed to higher-income households. In another study, researchers
from the Tax Policy Center at the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution deployed a
micro-simulation model using real tax data to estimate the distribution of benefits associated
with actual contributions to specific savings accounts and plans.30 Their groundbreaking
analysis reported that contributions made to 401(k)-type plans and IRAs reduced the
present value of income taxes by an average of $528 per tax filing unit in 2004. This
amounts to 1.2 percent of after-tax income (see Table 5).
TABLE 5
Tax Benefits of Contributions to Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement,* 2004
Defined Contribution Plans and IRAs IRAs Server’s Credit
Benefit as
Percent of
After-Tax
Income***
Share of
Total
Benefits
Average
Benefit ($)
Share of
Total
Benefits
Average
Benefit ($)
Share of
Total
Benefits
Average
Benefit ($)
Cash Income
Percentile**
Lowest Quintile 0.1 0.2 -6 0.2 0 2.6 -2
Second Quintile 0.4 2.9 -77 3.5 -7 28.4 -20
Middle Quintile 0.7 7.9 -208 11.5 -24 36.4 -26
Fourth Quintile 1.1 19.3 -509 26.8 -56 31.2 -22
Top Quintile 1.4 69.7 -1,838 58.0 -121 1.1 -1
All 1.2 100 -528 100.0 -42 100.0 -14
Top 10 Percent 1.4 48.6 -2,566 34.9 -145 0.6 -1
Top 5 Percent 1.2 30.4 -3,211 15.2 -126 0.1 0
Top 1 Percent 0.6 7.8 -4,111 2.0 -83 0.0 0
Top 0.5 Percent 0.4 4 -4,252 1.0 -84 0.0 0
Top 0.1 Percent 0.2 0.9 -4,645 0.1 -59 0.0 0
Addendum
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model.
*Distribution of the present value of lifetime tax benefits for new contributions made in 2004.
**Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. See http://taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm 
for a description of cash income.
***After-tax income is cash income less individual income tax net of refundable credits, payroll and estate tax liability, and imputed burden from corporate taxes.
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Significantly, however, they found that the distribution of these benefits is skewed,
concentrated among those with higher incomes. According to this simulation, about 
70 percent of tax benefits from new contributions accrue to the highest 20 percent 
of tax filers by income, roughly half of the benefits go to the top 10 percent, and 90
percent go to the top 40 percent of the income distribution.31 (See box, “The Distribution 
of Benefits Varies by Savings Vehicle Type.”)
The bottom 20 percent of households get virtually no benefit from the income tax
exclusion of savings plans. Few make contributions, and those that do contribute
smaller shares of their income. For these households, the tax benefit per dollar of
contribution is smaller, and in many cases has little or no value because the participant
has a low or zero marginal tax rate. This is why the bottom 60 percent receives 
only 11 percent of the total benefits associated with these policies. In contrast, the
highest-income taxpayers receive the largest benefit in dollar amounts, estimated 
to be $4,111 on average for the top 1 percent. For those in the top 5 percent, their
average benefit is $3,211, which accounts for over 30 percent of the total share. 
Another way to describe the data is in terms of income bands. The largest benefits,
calculated as a share of income, go to households with cash income between $75,000
and $500,000. This group, which is roughly in the 80th to 99th percentile of the
income distribution, receives about 66 percent of the benefits. The small group with
incomes above $500,000 receives 4.4 percent of the benefits. In contrast, those with
incomes below $50,000 receive 15 percent of the benefits even though they make 
up 65 percent of households.32
ASSESSING THE DELIVERY OF SAVINGS POLICY THROUGH 
THE TAX CODE
How efficient is this complex system of savings incentives delivered through the tax
code? That is a question easier asked than answered. There is a dearth of information
on savings behavior generally. The assessment of participation, contributions, and tax
benefits leaves many questions unanswered about why people save and how they go
about deciding to do it. For instance, although economists can distinguish between
various tax credits, deductions and deferrals, it is less clear how different individuals
respond to these incentives.
What can be examined is whether or not there has been an impact on the ultimate 
goal of these policy efforts: to bring new net savings.35 Unfortunately, the total amount 
of savings in the economy has declined in recent years even as tax subsidies have
increased.36 Of particular concern is the reality that individuals, particularly those with
high incomes and existing resources, can and do move assets around between various
accounts to maximize the tax benefits. This behavior raises the question of whether
there is a more effective allocation of these public resources. 
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To help achieve the policy goals of the tax incentives, policymakers should determine
where new savings are more likely to occur. Lower-income households, with currently
lower levels of savings, have significant potential to increase net new savings. Existing
evidence indicates that moderate-income households are more likely than higher-income
households to reduce their consumption when they make deposits to savings vehicles.37
Other work has found that 401(k) plans may have raised the savings of 
low-income households though they have not raised the overall asset levels 
of relatively high-income households.38
Despite the potential to generate additional savings, federal tax 
policy savings incentives are not working for lower-income households. 
A search for alternative policies to support savings was a prime motivation for 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS VARIES BY SAVINGS VEHICLE TYPE
401(k)-type plans
The Tax Policy Center analysis of married 
households shows that the likelihood of participation
and of making contributions to 401(k)-type plans
grew steadily with income.33 Approximately 41
percent of household heads in the top 20 percent 
of income participated in a savings plan, compared
with 4 percent in the bottom 20 percent. For spouses, 
the probability of participating and benefiting also
grew with income, until the top quintile group, 
where spousal participation declined. 
IRAs
Few low- and moderate-income households contribute
to IRAs even when they are eligible to receive tax
benefits. Among the participants in IRAs, average
contributions increase with income until the very 
top. As a result, the vast majority of tax benefits 
(83 percent) associated with IRAs are concentrated
between the 60th and 99th percentiles of the income
distribution. Sixty percent of benefits accrue to the
top 20 percent of households.34 Because eligibility 
for IRAs is subject to income limits, the tax benefits
are less skewed by income than benefits associated
with employer-sponsored plans.
Saver’s Credit
As a point of comparison, the Saver’s Credit has 
a very distinct distribution of benefits. Although 
the credit is not associated with a particular savings
account vehicle, it is designed to benefit low- and
moderate income households. The Tax Policy Center
analysis estimates that the Saver’s Credit is used 
by roughly 5 percent of tax filing units overall 
and between 7 to 9 percent of the tax units that 
file in the middle three quintiles (between the 20th
percentile and 80th percentile). The benefits are
considered modest as a share of after-tax income,
evenly distributed across these beneficiaries. 
Because the credit is not refundable, it is unavailable
to households in the bottom quintile, who generally
have no tax liability.
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a national demonstration project of matched savings accounts, called the American
Dream Demonstration. Evaluation of this experience showed that even program
participants with low incomes responded positively to savings incentives, overcoming
doubts among policymakers as to whether the poor could save.39 Key findings included
the observation that the majority of people in the demonstration were successfully able
to save during their participation in the program; and program characteristics, such 
as match rate, financial education, and use of direct deposit, are linked to savings
performance.40 The delivery of a direct match to savings deposits and support from
sponsoring organizations represented an alternative savings incentive and infrastructure
than what is offered to typical families with lower incomes and fewer resources. 
Without such supports, savings will remain difficult. This will particularly be the 
case if policy continues to rely on delivery mechanisms that are complex and poorly
understood. Consider the choice a prospective participant must make in deciding
between a traditional IRA and a Roth IRA. If all future contributions, earnings, and 
tax rates are equal, there should be no difference in the value of front-loaded or back-
loaded benefits. But if any of these factors vary, maximizing benefits depends on being
able to predict answers to such questions as how long one will live and what the marginal
income tax rate will be 20 or 30 years from now. Another source of uncertainty is the
mixed messages associated with saving in accounts labeled as “retirement” vehicles but
which have permissible uses that include non-retirement purposes. Taken together, there
is a relatively high degree of uncertainty that is likely to depress participation rates.
There are also more tangible barriers blocking the flow of benefits to lower-income
households. The majority of workers (over 60 percent) do not access defined-contribution
plans through their employers.41 In some cases, particularly for workers in low-income
jobs, employers do not offer the tax-favored accounts in employee compensation plans.
In other cases, the employer may offer the tax-favored account as a compensation
benefit, but research shows that many will not take advantage of opportunities to
participate in employer-sponsored plans if they have to affirmatively elect to do so;
take-up is higher if it happens automatically.42
Moreover, the uneven distribution of benefits is a prominent feature of the current
paradigm. Unequivocally, contributions and tax benefits rise with income, possibly
because for many lower-income families, the tax rules create incentives with little or no
value. The regressive distribution of tax benefits associated with these savings accounts
is particularly troubling because it misses an opportunity to assist families that could
benefit from increased savings.
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CONCLUSION
The current structure of savings incentives as delivered through the tax code discourages
savings by households with lower incomes and fewer resources. Not only do low-income
individuals often work for employers that do not offer access to savings plans, but they
have lower marginal tax rates and have less interest in sheltering income from taxation.
This population has savings needs as well that are not met through existing policy,
which remains difficult to navigate and filled with uncertainty. 
The complexity of rules that govern the range of accounts and low benefit levels
associated with contributing to them is a poor combination. It undercuts the potential
for low-income families to participate in savings and deprives them of access to an
important pathway to economic mobility. It is an area of public policy in need of reform.
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The very systems set up to provide a safety net and eventually help families move up 
the economic ladder, such as cash welfare and food support, are discouraging them
from getting ahead through their own asset development. There are two fundamental
goals to the provision of public assistance in the United States. First, to ensure households
have access to base levels of income, food, housing and medical assistance and, second,
to help families achieve financial independence. To qualify for public assistance, families
must demonstrate they are both income and asset poor. These eligibility rules are
designed to ensure that scarce public resources only go to families that are truly in need
of assistance. Yet certain eligibility rules, specifically restrictions on the amount of assets
a household can own, are actually counterproductive, directly undermining a family’s
ability to achieve economic security by discouraging saving. 
These “asset limits” actively discourage low-income households from saving for 
short-term emergency needs, investing in productive assets such as a car, or planning
for mobility-enhancing steps such as higher education, home ownership, or business
ownership. By penalizing prudence with a reduction or loss of benefits, asset limits 
send the wrong message. In doing so, they encourage families to avoid saving or hide
their finances by using expensive alternative financial service providers instead of banks
and credit unions. This behavior blocks potential pathways to economic mobility that
depend on savings.
Recently, policymakers at the state and federal level from both sides of the aisle have
begun to recognize the merit in removing these obstacles to savings and have taken steps
to reform asset limits in public assistance programs. Since welfare reform empowered
states to set their own criteria for eligibility, dozens of states have liberalized the asset
limit in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. President
George W. Bush recommended the exclusion of all education and retirement savings
accounts when determining eligibility for food stamps, a proposal ultimately embraced 
by both Democrats and Republicans as part of the 2008 Food, Conservation and
Energy Act. In the first budget of his administration, President Barack Obama signaled
his interest in broadly reforming asset limits in public assistance programs.43
Yet while progress has been made, reform efforts have been uneven. Policy changes 
in isolated programs or individual states have resulted in a confusing and sometimes
contradictory patchwork of rules that vary across programs and states. 
CHAPTER 3
SAVINGS POLICY AND ELIGIBILITY RULES 
FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
Rourke O’Brien
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Asset limits vary widely across federal programs and states. An asset limit, 
or asset test, is a threshold on the amount of resources a family can own and still be
eligible for assistance. The asset limit in major public assistance programs includes
specific rules for the treatment of all household assets in determining eligibility, including
vehicles, “restricted” accounts such as retirement (401(k), IRA) and education (529,
Coverdell) accounts, and “unrestricted” assets including money in checking and 
savings accounts and cash on hand. The owner-occupied home is the only asset that 
is uniformly excluded from consideration when determining eligibility for these major
public assistance programs.44
Asset limits vary widely across programs and, in some cases, within programs,
especially where states are authorized to set their own eligibility criteria. The asset limit
for TANF eligibility, for example, varies remarkably across states. As of July 2007, 
• Fifteen states exclude all vehicles in the household, 18 exclude one vehicle per
household or per driver, and the rest only exclude a portion of any vehicle’s equity
or fair market value; 
• Eleven states employ an asset limit of $1,000, whereas two states—Ohio and
Virginia—employ no limit; 
• Some states exclude assets in restricted accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs
whereas other states count moneys in these accounts.45
By contrast, the asset limit for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP, formerly food stamps) is set by the federal government at $2,000 (or $3,000 for
households with elderly or disabled persons); although states do have some flexibility,
including the ability to streamline the treatment of specific assets, such as vehicles,
across programs.46 Virtually every public assistance program, including TANF, SNAP,
Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), employs an asset limit. A summary
of the asset limit rules in major public assistance programs are provided in Table A8 
in the Appendix. 
Asset limits discourage savings. The theoretical connection between asset limits 
and low levels of asset accumulation is clear: by limiting eligibility and assistance to those
who have little or no assets, asset limits discourage saving.47 A number of researchers have
attempted to test this claim empirically, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Quantitative studies using observational data from major household surveys appear 
to yield mixed results; some researchers have found that higher asset limits translate
into higher asset holdings and others have failed to find such effects. However, studies
that found no effect failed to account for the fact that many low-income families receive
assistance from multiple public programs; liberalizing the asset limit in one program
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may have no effect if families are still subject to the restrictive limits of another program.
This “program layering” of eligibility rules makes it difficult to successfully isolate the
effect of a single rule in a specific program on the asset holdings of a family subject 
to multiple rules in multiple programs. Studies that were able to look at households
governed by a single program, notably Medicaid, did find that increasing or eliminating
the asset limit resulted in increased household assets. In addition, studies agree the asset
limit on vehicles undermines car ownership. A more detailed discussion and critique 
of existing quantitative studies is presented in the Appendix. 
The only existing qualitative study to date investigated the impact of eliminating 
the asset limit in TANF on the savings attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of welfare
recipients.48 The study’s author, O’Brien, interviewed current TANF recipients on the
border of two states with remarkably different asset limits for TANF: Maryland, which
at the time employed a limit of $2,000 on assets, and Virginia, which at the time was
one of only two states that did not employ an asset test. Despite the difference in policy,
O’Brien found no difference in the savings perceptions, attitudes and reported behaviors
of TANF recipients—welfare recipients in both states indicated they were less likely 
to save for fear of failing the asset test and being denied assistance. In addition, TANF
recipients in both states described how the asset limit led them to avoid formal financial
institutions such as banks or credit unions, afraid that using a checking or savings
account may jeopardize their eligibility. The author speculates that there was no
difference between the states because the policy change in change in Virginia had not
been sufficiently articulated to current welfare recipients. Although this may be true, 
it is also likely that the TANF recipients interviewed were also receiving SNAP, a program
that employs a limit of $2,000 and does not vary by state. Therefore, despite the lack 
of an asset test in TANF, recipients in Virginia were subject to the same de facto asset
limit of $2,000 as TANF recipients in Maryland. 
This is not to deny the fact that many low-income households report asset holdings 
so low that the asset test should theoretically have no affect on their behavior. And 
this is not to imply that asset tests are singularly responsible for the very low levels of
savings reported by low-income families—to be sure, eliminating asset limits in public
assistance programs is unlikely to result in a dramatic increase in the asset holdings 
of low-income families. It is instructive, however, to consider how the existence of asset
limits may affect how and to what extent people save and build assets. O’Brien found
asset limits encourage TANF recipients to save money at home instead of a bank
account or avoid saving entirely for fear of losing benefits. These are the same families
who in quantitative studies such as those reviewed above are likely to be seen as having
too little wealth to be affected by asset tests. Conversations with actual welfare recipients
reveal that these tests do in fact have significant, perverse affects on savings and
economic behavior even for very low-income families. Analysis of survey data on
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savings that is limited to formal account holdings would wrongly conclude that these
individuals do not save and are not affected by asset limits. The very existence of asset
limits may actually, in part, account for why we see very low-income households report
very little in savings.
ASSESSING SAVINGS POLICIES IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Beyond obscuring the ability of quantitative research to directly study the impact 
of asset limits on the asset accumulation of low-income households, the “layering” 
of public assistance complicates proposals for reform. Previous efforts to reform asset
limits at both the federal and state level have focused on changing the asset limit rules
in a specific program. Yet reforming the asset limit in one program may have little
effect on the ground as many families are covered by multiple programs and multiple
rules. Therefore, any reform of asset limits must be standardized across programs to 
the largest extent possible. 
In addition, public assistance programs serve different functions for different populations.
Eligibility rules therefore should be tailored to reflect the needs of specific populations.
To reform asset limits so that they can continue to serve as a useful determinant of
eligibility without undermining the ability of low-income families to achieve financial
security and economic independence, it is instructive to consider the assets and public
assistance needs of two distinct populations: working-age families (both disabled and
non-disabled) and the non-institutionalized elderly.49 (See box, “Why Different Rules 
for Working-Age Families and the Elderly?”)
For the working-age population, the goal of public assistance is to provide both 
a safety net “consumption floor” and ongoing work supports for low-income families.
Programs such as TANF are designed to provide temporary, targeted cash assistance 
to very low-income families who are required to actively pursue employment as a
means to self-sufficiency. SNAP, Medicaid, and SSI assistance can act as a temporary
safety net for families faced with unexpected income shocks as well as provide ongoing
support for families whose incomes are insufficient to cover basic consumption needs.
Each of these programs is designed to help low-income families maintain a base level 
of consumption while encouraging self-sufficiency. Asset limits serve to undermine that
goal by inhibiting families from accessing reliable transportation, preventing families
from saving for short- and long-term needs, and discouraging the use of formal
financial institutions such as banks and credit unions.
Asset limits also affect the economic security of low-income individuals over the age 
of 65 by requiring that elderly individuals spend down nearly all of their assets before
qualifying for assistance. However, removing asset limits or excluding specific assets,
such as retirement accounts, would allow elderly households to retain significant assets
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and still qualify for public assistance. Old-age income support programs would then, 
in effect, be used to subsidize intergenerational wealth transfers that many would argue
is not the goal of these programs and not a proper use of government dollars. At the
same time, it is important to reform asset rules so that elderly households who did save
during their working years are better off than if they had not saved. Moreover, although
elderly households should be required to spend down their savings in retirement, they
should not have to deplete everything before receiving assistance, lest they be left vulnerable
to unanticipated financial shocks. With these considerations in mind, we offer below a
set of broad principles for reforming asset eligibility rules for elderly households.
All families need access to reliable transportation. Numerous studies have detailed
the positive relationship between vehicle ownership and employment: low-income
workers who have access to a car are more likely to be employed, work more hours,
and, in some studies, have been found to earn more than low-income workers who do 
not have access to a vehicle.51 One study of TANF recipients in Tennessee found that
families who have access to a car spend less time on public assistance and are more
likely to be employed, earn higher wages and work more hours.52 Research by James
Sullivan and others (summarized in the Appendix), demonstrates that households
subject to an asset limit on vehicles are significantly less likely to own a car. 
All families need savings for emergencies and short- and medium-term
consumption needs. Under the current rules, families who manage to save more than
a few hundred dollars for Christmas or unanticipated, emergency expenses are likely 
to run afoul of the asset limit once they deposit their paycheck into their checking account.
Consider the SSI program. SSI provides much needed cash assistance to both low-income working-age persons
with disabilities and to low-income elderly persons who cannot work, or can work little. Because SSI 
is a means-tested program, it is understandable that the assets of the elderly—specifically moneys held 
in retirement accounts—be considered when determining eligibility for assistance; retirees with several 
million dollars in the bank should not qualify for this anti-poverty program. 
However, for working-age persons with disabilities who are able to work, saving should be encouraged for
precautionary needs, short-term goals, and long-term retirement planning. Since the asset test in SSI 
counts any money saved in defined contribution retirement plans such as 401(k)s and IRAs when determining
eligibility, working age persons with disabilities are likely to avoid saving for retirement, lest they jeopardize
their eligibility for SSI and consequently in many cases, Medicaid.50 What makes sense for those over 
65 does not for working-age families, even under the same program.
WHY DIFFERENT RULES FOR WORKING-AGE FAMILIES AND THE ELDERLY?
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Furthermore, the asset limit on unrestricted assets creates an incentive for families to
spend, instead of save, their tax refund and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Without
savings, families are less likely to experience upward economic mobility.53
All working-age families need savings for retirement. By counting money saved in
retirement accounts, asset limits create a disincentive for low-income families to make
long-term investments in their financial security. Whereas traditionally defined benefit
pension plans have always been excluded in determining eligibility for major public
assistance programs, many programs count money held in defined contribution plans,
including 401(k)s and IRAs.54 These limits may discourage many low-wage workers
from participating in employer-sponsored retirement plans such as 401(k)s for fear 
of losing benefits. 
All working-age families can benefit from saving for higher education.
The connection between overall household wealth and educational attainment and
achievement is well documented.55 Recent years have seen increased investment in 529
savings plans, a tax-advantaged financial product specifically designed to help families
save for higher education expenses. As of December 2008, more than nine million
accounts have been opened nationwide. In an effort to increase enrollment by low-
income families, a number of states have increased education awareness and outreach
and introduced targeted incentives, such as matching deposits. Program rules that count
529 plans and Coverdell education savings accounts toward the asset limit actively
discourage saving and investing in higher education and may encourage low-income
families to liquidate their child’s college savings in order to qualify for assistance.
All families can benefit from conducting financial transactions with formal
financial institutions such as a bank or credit union. By employing a strict limit on
unrestricted savings and requiring applicants to hand over detailed records of financial
activities, asset limits encourage low-income households to be “unbanked” and use
costly, alternative financial service providers such as check cashers for routine transactions.
Asset limits should be standardized across programs wherever possible.
Low-income families who qualify for multiple forms of public assistance are currently
forced to navigate a complex web of asset eligibility rules that vary across programs and
between states. In addition to ensuring that all program eligibility rules allow low-income
families to own a car and save for short and long term needs, streamlining the asset test
for eligibility will simplify the application process, reducing caseworker burden and the
potential for reporting error.
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Non-institutionalized, elderly households should spend their retirement savings
to cover household expenses. As we expect elderly persons with retirement savings
to supplement Social Security income by spending down money saved in their working
years, retirement accounts cannot be wholly disregarded from eligibility considerations.
Non-institutionalized, elderly households should be able to maintain modest savings
and still qualify for public assistance. To qualify for SSI, very low-income, elderly
households can hold no more than $3,000 in assets, including money in both unrestricted
accounts (checking, savings) and restricted accounts (including 401(k)s, IRAs). Elderly
households should be able to maintain modest savings to supplement income when
necessary and cover anticipated and unanticipated expenses without jeopardizing
eligibility for public assistance (SNAP, Medicaid).
Income from retirement savings should receive preferential treatment in determining
benefits (SSI, Medicaid) for non-institutionalized elderly households. Under current
rules in the SSI program, any moneys drawn down from savings are counted as
household income and thereby reduce the SSI benefit $1 for $1—an effective 100
percent tax rate on retirement savings. This means that low-income elderly households
who saved for retirement are no better off than those who did not. Retirement savings
should be rewarded, not penalized.
CONCLUSION
Liberalization of program eligibility rules may result in some increase in the number 
of families eligible for assistance. The actual number of newly eligible cases is hard 
to estimate and will vary by program and largely depend on the specific details of the
reform. One clear objection to the reforms detailed above is likely to come from the
states, especially those that currently employ restrictive asset limits in TANF and Medicaid.
Given the current budget climate, states may be unwilling or unable to cope with an
increased caseload and will likely object to rule changes that are not coupled with an
increase in federal dollars, such as for the TANF block grant and Medicaid funds.
However, reforming asset limits should, in time, reduce the number of families 
receiving assistance and shorten time spent on public assistance programs. 
Moreover, through standardizing rules across programs and streamlining the eligibility
process, states should enjoy significant administrative savings as well as reduced error
rates. Further research is needed to determine whether asset ownership reduces the
likelihood a family will turn to public assistance in the event of an income shock 
and the duration of time spent on assistance.
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Given the link between savings and upward economic mobility demonstrated in the
first chapter of this report, it makes sense for public policy to support savings and
wealth creation. An array of public policy levers are deployed to do just that, most of
them embedded in the tax code. However, these mechanisms work best for households
that have higher incomes. Families with lower incomes not only have lower savings
rates, but they receive fewer benefits from current policy. To make matters worse, 
the safety net programs intended to help protect families in times of need discourage 
a specific behavior that is essential to self-sufficiency and economic mobility: savings. 
In order to advance an economic mobility agenda, policy efforts should focus on
rewarding savings by households striving to move up the economic ladder.
ENCOURAGING SAVINGS THROUGH THE TAX CODE
The twin principles of fairness and inclusion, combined with a goal to promote
economic mobility, can serve as a foundation for considering ways to reform savings
policy to effectively reach low- and moderate-income households. Policymakers should
build on the findings of the American Dream Demonstration that showed that even
people with lower incomes could save if given access to a supportive infrastructure.56
While there are many elements to such an infrastructure, one primary feature is the
design of incentives offered through the tax code. In order to create viable pathways 
to economic mobility, policy must redesign these incentives to make them more
accessible and meaningful for families with lower incomes, fewer resources, and 
lower tax liabilities.
These changes will be most effective if they consider how to reach those that currently
do not save or own anything. Revamping the tax code should not be done to reward
asset shifting; rather the nation should strive to create an accessible and inclusive
savings policy that ensures all Americans can participate in the savings process. 
Create accessible savings incentives through employment and at tax time.
Ensuring equal access to policy benefits is the cornerstone of a fair and inclusive
savings policy. Since the savings process is already facilitated for many through their
place of employment, encouraging more employers to offer savings should be a primary
policy objective. The ability to use payroll deductions to deliver direct deposits is a vital
tool. However, since many workers have multiple employers and uneven work histories,
policymakers should look for other opportunities to link households with savings
CHAPTER 4
ENCOURAGING SAVINGS TO ADVANCE
MOBILITY
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opportunities. A primary means to do this is through the tax filing process, which can
serve as an infrastructure to support savings through the delivery of tax refunds into
designated savings vehicles. 
Additionally, as the recent findings of behavioral economics confirm, human inertia 
is a major influence on saving behavior, and we should always look for ways to take
advantage of it. One way to do this is to make sure that the default settings for a given
savings program are set optimally. For example, recent policy changes have made it
easier for employers to automatically enroll employees in their savings plans while
allowing workers to opt out if they choose to go to the effort.57 This approach has
increased participation rates among workers at all income levels. Other features
associated with automatic enrollment that can make savings more productive include
escalating contribution amounts over time as a matter of course. 
Offer incentives with meaningful value for households with low incomes and
low tax liabilities. Regardless of whether tax subsidies for higher-income households
are reduced, increased benefits should go to those who need them and who are not
served by current policy. This will entail raising the value of incentives. The current
approach, which reduces tax liabilities for contributions either at the time of deposit or
withdrawal, will not be meaningful for the targeted lower-income population unless the
means for delivering benefits changes substantially. 
Two potential reforms are promising. The first is the increased use of refundable 
tax credits that would have value to households even when they had low or no tax
liabilities. These refundable tax credits could deliver money into designated accounts
after contributions had been made. Another approach that would create meaningful
incentives would be to have the government directly match deposits in designated
accounts after households made and reported contributions. This direct match
approach has the advantage of being transparent and also could be facilitated 
through the tax filing process.
Limit complexity and maximize coherence in federally-sanctioned savings
accounts and plans. Rules in these accounts should be simplified and the number of
special accounts consolidated in ways that allow consumers to save for multiple purposes.
This might entail creating one class of accounts that are only for retirement and another
that can be used for multiple purposes, such as education, homeownership, or other 
life contingencies. Finally, a streamlined system would be easier to incorporate into 
the workplace, so more employers would offer savings opportunities that encourage
maximum participation of workers. 
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Specific policies have recently been proposed that hold promise for creating incentives
more aligned with these principles.58 The Obama administration is supporting the creation
of Auto IRAs that will offer increased access to savings plans by workers whose employers
do not currently offer them. They have also proposed making the Saver’s Credit
refundable to make it more valuable to lower-income workers even when they don’t
have a tax liability. This approach would provide 87 percent of its benefits to the
bottom 60 percent of taxpayers, including 34 percent of the benefits to the third
quintile, 38 percent for the second quintile and 15 percent for the bottom quintile.59
Ensure everyone has access to a retirement savings plan. Automatically enrolling
employees in employer-sponsored 401(k)-type plans promotes savings. Positive features 
of these plans include low-cost administration, limited investment options, and direct
deposits from payroll. The public sector is accumulating experience in operating such
plans; the federal government already runs the Thrift Savings Plan for its employees
and each state manages their own 529 College Savings Plan to promote savings for
postsecondary education. These are models to build upon because accounts are portable
and not tied to a specific employer. Access to a savings plan is a fundamental pillar 
of an inclusive savings infrastructure.
ENCOURAGING SAVINGS IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Reforming the current morass of confusing rules governing the treatment of assets 
in program eligibility is an important step to ensuring that public assistance programs
do, in fact, promote and not impede economic security and economic mobility. Simply
reforming asset limits, however, is not enough. The provision and delivery of public
assistance programs must be recalibrated to encourage and facilitate the asset development
needs of low-income families: from basic financial education and counseling to quality
financial products; from defaults that opt families into positive economic behaviors to
thoughtful consumer protections; from new employer-based savings mechanisms through
payroll deduction to meaningful savings incentives that move beyond the tax code. 
Policymakers and practitioners should work to use the connection between client 
and social service provider as an opportunity to encourage savings and sound financial
management. To do so, several strategic opportunities should be pursued that connect
low-income families to safe financial products and quality financial education.
The following proposals are tempered by consideration of the potential cost of
implementation and appreciation for arguments that asset limits serve an important
function in preserving benefits for those truly in need. 
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Standardize asset limits on unrestricted savings by setting a national “floor”
across programs. Policymakers should mandate that any public assistance program
cannot employ a limit on unrestricted assets lower than a prescribed national threshold,
indexed to inflation. This national threshold should be high enough to allow families 
to maintain a modest level of savings and still qualify for assistance, yet low enough 
to ensure that public assistance programs are reserved for those most in need (see box,
“Why Not Complete Elimination?”). The national floor would replace the current liquid
asset limit threshold in all public assistance programs including TANF, SNAP, Medicaid,
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), SSI, Low-income Energy
Assistance, and many forms of housing and child care assistance. States, however, will
retain the flexibility granted to them under various programs to increase the limit above
this new threshold or eliminate the asset test outright. This new floor will be applied to
asset limits on both applicants and current recipients of public assistance programs.60
A national floor on unrestricted assets also should be implemented in public assistance
programs that serve individuals over the age of 65 (SSI, SNAP, and Medicaid).
• Exclude a portion of money held in qualified retirement savings accounts 
such as IRAs and 401(k)s when determining eligibility for assistance.61
• Disregard a portion of money withdrawn from retirement savings in calculating
household income and, therefore, when determining SSI benefits.62
Standardize treatment of specific assets. Beyond money held in savings accounts,
families hold assets in a wide range of forms. These include their cars, homes, and other
types of financial products, such as retirement accounts and savings bonds. Asset limits
policies should move in the direction of standardizing the treatment of these diverse
asset forms in the following manner:
• Vehicles: Exclude all vehicles. A blanket exclusion of vehicles, as a number 
of states have done in both SNAP and TANF, would streamline the enrollment
process and reduce administrative burden. An alternative policy would be 
to exclude one vehicle per licensed adult in the household.
• EITC: Streamline the treatment across programs to the current SNAP rule by
excluding the amount of any EITC refund from asset limits for 12 months after
receipt. The exclusion of other refundable credits should be considered as well,
notably the federal child tax credit. States also should be encouraged to exclude
the amount of state EITC where applicable.
• Retirement Accounts: Streamline treatment across programs to current SNAP
rules by excluding all defined contribution retirement savings plans, including
IRAs, 401(k)s, and 403(b)s.65 Defined benefit retirement plans (pensions) are
already excluded. 
• College Savings: Streamline treatment across programs to current SNAP 
rules by excluding all 529 and Coverdell college savings plans.66
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• Savings Bonds: Exclude the value of bonds until maturity. The value of 
savings bonds should not be counted as an asset by the applicant for public
assistance unless that individual is the designated beneficiary and has full 
rights to redeem the bond. Further, there should be consideration for setting 
an upper bound on this blanket exclusion, perhaps excluding the first $20,000 
in savings bonds from the asset test.
• Individual Development Accounts: Exclude from eligibility considerations
resources held in these matched savings accounts targeted to lower-income
persons when the accounts are funded all or in part with federal dollars 
or defined in federal programs.67
WHY NOT COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ASSET LIMITS?
Given the negative impact of asset tests on economic behavior and the complexity of the current rules, 
some advocate for the complete elimination of asset limits in public assistance programs, at least for persons 
of working age.63 This approach is attractive for reasons both logistic and symbolic: outright elimination would
standardize eligibility rules across programs, while sending a powerful message to low-income households that
government programs no longer penalize saving. Further, outright elimination of the asset limit in the TANF
program, for example, is unlikely to result in “un-needy” families receiving benefits, because of the very
restrictive income test in most states, as well as the strict work requirements, time limits, and stigma associated
with the program that already serve as effective deterrents. 
Yet it is important to consider that in some programs the asset limit does play a role in ensuring benefits, 
and public dollars, only go to those truly in need. SNAP eligibility, for example, is determined solely by an
income and asset test—no additional stipulations are placed on families for assistance. Removing the asset test
therefore would permit any household with an income less than 130 percent of the Federal Poverty Line to
qualify for SNAP assistance, even if they hold tens of thousands of dollars in their checking accounts. While
such a population is admittedly quite small—and many would argue virtually nonexistent—the potential 
may warrant keeping some restriction in place.
Some have proposed a national floor on asset limits of $10,000.64 In their seminal 2001 paper 
on assets and economic well-being, economists Edward Wolff and Robert Haveman designed a measure of asset
poverty that has proven to be a useful tool in research and policy design. According to Wolff and Haveman, 
a family is in asset poverty if they do not have enough liquid assets to support their family for three months 
at the federal poverty level in the event of a complete loss of income resulting from illness or unemployment. 
In 2009, this translates to $5,512.50 for a family of four. At the same time, families should have the flexibility 
to use their checking and saving accounts for normal household budgeting, i.e. families who have amassed five
or six thousand dollars in emergency savings should not have to worry about whether their account balance on
payday or the day before the rent is due pushes them over the asset limit. This suggests that an initial floor 
of $10,000 may be appropriate. Coincidentally, in 1991 President George H.W. Bush and Housing and 
Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp recommended increasing the asset limit in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the precursor to TANF, from $1,000 to $10,000. 
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Streamline the process of asset verification with a national standard.
The process of verifying income and assets in the course of determining eligibility varies by
program and across states. In many instances, the requirements for verifying an individual’s
assets often are unnecessarily burdensome on both the applicant and caseworker. In some
states, individuals are required to supply bank statements from any account they have
ever held, even those no longer in operation. In some states, an individual is determined
to be ineligible for assistance if the balance of their transaction accounts rose above the
asset limit threshold at any point in the last 30 days, whereas other states only consider
the balance on the day of application, meaning eligibility may hinge on whether or not the
rent check for that month has cleared the account. State and federal policymakers should
work to streamline the process of asset verification to ease the administrative burden on
clients and caseworkers. In order to encourage more low-income families to use formal
financial institutions, policymakers should ensure that individuals who do have a bank
account are not subject to extraordinary or overly burdensome reporting requirements.68
Encourage direct deposit of benefits and facilitate opening of basic bank accounts.
More than one-quarter of households in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution
lack any transaction account.69 Research demonstrates that low-income families who
have access to a bank account are less likely to use costly alternative financial service
providers, such as check cashers, and are more likely to save and own productive
assets.70 Social service offices should make every effort to connect applicants and
recipients of public assistance to reasonably priced, high-quality financial products 
and services. At the local level, social service agencies can partner with local financial
institutions to offer basic banking products for current and former recipients of public
assistance. At the state and federal level, policymakers can negotiate with major
financial institutions to provide basic bank accounts for low-income families.71
Expand the capabilities of Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards. As a result
of modernization efforts in the 1990s, all SNAP benefits are currently issued electronically
by way of an EBT card issued by the state, usually through a private financial services
contractor. Individuals draw their benefits at point-of-sale transactions using their state-
issued EBT card. Most states also use EBT cards as the primary vehicle for individuals
to access cash benefits such as TANF. Individuals receiving SSI and Social Security
payments also have an electronic card option with similar capabilities known as Direct
Express. States and the federal government should work with the partnering financial
service provider(s) to expand the capabilities of these cards by linking them to accounts.
Families could then reload money to the card and potentially even send remittances
and draw down money orders from the account. Additionally, a number of states have
formed coalitions to negotiate lower fees with contracted financial services providers issuing
the EBT. States should negotiate better terms for their clients as well, including more
free ATM withdrawals and the opportunity to connect to a basic banking product. 
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Expand financial education and counseling. In order to achieve self-sufficiency,
families must be equipped with basic financial skills, from balancing a checkbook to
picking the right financial product to making a household budget. States should be
encouraged to provide financial education courses to current recipients of public
assistance or help connect families to free resources in their community as well as 
count financial education courses as a “work activity” under TANF.72 In addition, 
social service agencies should work with local nonprofits or financial institutions to
connect clients with free, one-on-one financial counseling—given the complexity of
today’s financial products and the need for smart financial planning, all families, 
even very low-income families, require and deserve personalized financial counseling.73
CONCLUSION
These discrete proposals should receive scrutiny in the near future and could improve
savings outcomes by a population that is missed by current policy. Yet this does not
replace the need to reform the larger deficiencies of current savings policy that, in turn,
entails taking on the broader issues of the tax system’s overall fairness and efficiency.
The tax system has many problems that need to be addressed, including its inability 
to produce enough revenue to avoid compounding deficits. When this work begins 
in earnest, policymakers should consider increased savings as one of the primary
objectives of reform. 
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TABLE A1
Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement, Education, and Health Care
Tax-Favored
Savings Vehicle
401(k) Private-sector
employees with
compensation under
$245,000.
Employee contribution
limit by elective deferral
$16,500 for under 50;
Catch-up contribution
limit for 50+ $5,500;
Total contribution limit
lesser of $49,000 or AGI.
Termination of
employment or plan, 
in case of financial
hardship, death,
disability, or when 
the participant 
reaches 59½.
Contributions are 
tax-deductible (front-
loaded); distributions
are taxed.
Limits IRA
deductibility.
403(b) Employees of certain
tax-exempt and
public education
institutions.
Lesser of limit on
annual additions
($49,000 or 100%
includible compensation),
or limit on elective
deferrals ($16,500);
For 50+, catch up
contribution lesser 
of $5,500 or excess 
of compensation over
elective deferrals.
59½, severance from
employment, death,
disability, financial
hardship or qualified
reservist.
Contributions 
are tax-deductible
(front-loaded);
Distributions 
are taxed.
Contribution limits
applies to all plans
(401(k), 501(c)(18),
SIMPLE, SEP,
403(b)); Limits IRA
deductibility; Can
rollover to Traditional
IRA or non-Roth
eligible retirement
plan; Can convert 
to Roth IRA.
Governmental
457 Plan
Non-school state 
and local government
employees.
Employee contribution
limit by elective deferral
lesser of $16,500 or
adjusted gross income
(AGI) for those under
50; For those 50 and
over and within 3 years
of retirement lesser of
$33,000 or basic annual
limit plus under-utilized
basic annual limit in
prior years.
Termination of
employment, in case 
of financial hardship,
or when the
participant reaches
70½.
Contributions 
are tax-deductible
(front-loaded);
Distributions 
are taxed.
Not necessary to
coordinate maximum
deferral with
contributions to other
retirement plans.
Limits IRA
deductibility.
SIMPLE 401(k) Small business
employees.
Employee contribution
limit by elective deferral
$11,500 for under 50;
Catch-up contribution
up to $2,500 for over 50;
Employer contribution
limit is (1) mandatory
matching contribution
not exceeding 3% of
compensation or (2)
non-elective contribution
of 2% of the first
$245,000 of
compensation .
Termination of
employment or plan, 
in case of financial
hardship, or when 
the participant 
reaches 59½.
Generally same as
401(k) with additional
limits on the employer
deduction.
Employer may not
maintain any other
retirement plan.
Retirement
Income Limits
and Eligibility
Rules
Contribution
Limits
Qualified 
Uses
Tax 
Treatment
Interaction
with 
Other Plans
Employer-Sponsored Plans
...continued
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TABLE A1
Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement, Education, and Health Care ...continued
Retirement (continued)
Employer-Sponsored Plans... continued
Qualified plans
(a.k.a H.R. 10 or
Keough Plans)
Self-employed
individual, including
sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and
unincorporated
entities.
25% of net self-
employment earnings,
up to a maximum of
$49,000 for defined
contribution plans; 
Up to $195,000 for
defined benefit plans.
Contributions are 
tax-deductible ;
Distributions taxed 
as income after age
59½; Early
distribution penalty 
of 10% additional 
tax unless death or 
fall under exception;
Eligible rollovers 
not taxed 
Tax-free rollover 
to Traditional IRA 
or another eligible
retirement plan.
SIMPLE IRA Small business
employees.
Employee contribution
limit by elective deferral
$11,500 for under 50;
Catch-up contribution
up to $2,500 for over
50; Employer
contribution limit is 
(1) mandatory
matching contribution
not exceeding 3% 
of compensation or 
(2) non-elective
contribution of 2% 
of the first $245,000 
of compensation.
Contributions 
are tax-deductible 
(front-loaded);
distribution rules 
the same as 
traditional IRAs.
Employer may not
maintain any other
retirement plan.
Simplified
Employee Pension
(SEP) IRA
Small business
employees; Self-
employed individuals.
Employer contributions
limit lesser of 25% of
employee compensation
or $49,000.
Contributions are 
tax-deductible for
employer; distribution
rules the same as
Traditional IRAs.
...continued
Tax-Favored
Savings Vehicle
Income Limits
and Eligibility
Rules
Contribution
Limits
Qualified 
Uses
Tax 
Treatment
Interaction
with 
Other Plans
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TABLE A1
Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement, Education, and Health Care ...continued
Retirement (continued)
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA)
Traditional IRA Have earned income
and (a) not be in an
employer-sponsored
retirement plan or 
(b) have AGI under
$109,000 (married
filing jointly) or
$65,000 (single);
phaseouts begin 
at $89,000 and
$55,000, respectively
and at $10,000 for
married filing
separately; Must 
be under 70½.
$5,000 for those 
under 50; $6,000 for
those 50 and over
Contributions are tax-
deductible (front-loaded);
Excess contributions
subject to 6% tax if not
withdrawn; Distributions
before 59½ are subject
to 10% penalty with 
the exception of death,
disability, a series of
substantially equal
payments, or: (1) health
insurance premiums 
for the unemployed 
(2) qualified higher
education expenses 
(3) qualified first-time
home buyer expenses
($10k max).
Contributions are 
taxed (back-loaded);
Distributions are tax-
free after the owner 
has held the account 
for 5 years and reaches
59½, dies or becomes
disabled, or uses the
funds for qualified 
first-time home buyer
expenses; 10 percent
penalty tax for non-
qualified withdrawal.
Contribution limit
applies to sum of
contributions to all
IRAs; Can rollover to 
a Traditional IRA, an
employer’s qualified
retirement plan, 457
plan, 403 plan; Can
rollover from IRAs,
qualified trusts,
403(a), 457, 403(b)
annuities; Can convert
amounts to Roth IRA
if AGI not more than
$100,000 and not
married filing
separately, but must
pay income tax 
on principal.
Roth IRA AGI under $176,000
(married filing
jointly), $120,000
(single) or $10,000
(married filing
separately and 
living with spouse);
phase-outs begin 
at $166,000,
$105,000, and 
$0, respectively.
$5,000 for those 
under 50; $6,000 for
those 50 and over.
Contributions are 
taxed (back-loaded);
Distributions are tax-
free after the owner has
held the account for 
5 years and reaches
59½, dies or becomes
disabled, or uses the
funds for qualified 
first-time home buyer
expenses; 10 percent
penalty tax for non-
qualified withdrawal.
Contribution limit
applies to sum of
contributions to all
IRAs; Can convert 
to traditional IRA;
Can rollover from
Employer’s plan.
...continued
Tax-Favored
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Income Limits
and Eligibility
Rules
Contribution
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Treatment
Interaction
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Other Plans
ECONOM IC  MOB I L I T Y  PRO JECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
41 A Penny Saved is Mobility Earned: Advancing Economic Mobility through Savings
TABLE A1
Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement, Education, and Health Care ...continued
Retirement (continued)
Tax Credits
Saver’s Credit Filer at least 18; Not
full-time student
claimed as a
dependent; AGI not
more than $55,500
joint, $41,625 head
of household, or
$27,750 all others.
Maximum $2,000
contribution to a
federally sanctioned
retirement plan.
N/A Non-refundable tax
credit worth 10–50% of
the eligible
contributions
Only get credit when
payroll deduction
contribution made 
to a 401(k), 403(b),
SIMPLE, SEP or
governmental 457;
contribution made 
to a Traditional or Roth
IRA; contribution made
to a 501(c)(18) plan.
Education
Coverdell Education
Savings Account
(ESA)
Beneficiary must be
under 18 (excluding
special needs
beneficiary); Modified
AGI must be below
$220,000 (married
filing jointly), under
$110,000 (single);
phase-outs begin at
$190,000 and
$95,000, respectively.
$2,000 per beneficiary. Certain elementary,
secondary, and higher
education expenses;
Contributions to 529
Plans.
Tax-free earnings 
and withdrawals for
qualified expenses
(back-loaded); non-
qualified distributions
generally penalized with
10% additional tax.
Can contribute
Coverdell funds to
529 Plans tax-free.
529 Plans/Qualified
Tuition Program
(QTP)
Anyone can establish
an account for a
designated
beneficiary.
Varies by state;
Contribution limit 
is often high; Cannot 
be more than amount
necessary to provide for
qualified educational
expenses.
Tuition, room, board,
fees, books, and
supplies at accredited
institutions of higher
education.
Tax-free earnings 
and distributions for
qualified expenses
(back-loaded).
N/A 
Education 
Savings Bond
Program
Purchased EE bond
issued after 1989 at
age 24+; Pays for
qualified education
expenses; Modified
adjusted gross income
less than $82,100 for
single, $130,650
married or qualifying
widow(er); Filing
status not married
filing separately;
Benefits phase out
starting at $67,100
single ($100,650 joint
or widow(er));
Income limit $82,100
single ($130,650 joint
or widow(er)).
None. Qualified educational
expenses.
Interest earned on
portion of bond used 
for qualified education
expenses not taxed.
N/A
...continued
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TABLE A1
Tax-Favored Savings Vehicles Associated with Retirement, Education, and Health Care ...continued
Health Savings
Account (HSA)
Covered by a
HDHP74; Have no
other health coverage
with some exceptions;
Not enrolled in
Medicare; Not a
dependent.
$3,000 for self-
coverage; $5,950 for
family coverage 
Most medical care 
and services, dental
care, and vision care;
Also includes over-the-
counter drugs.
Employer contributions
excluded from gross
income; Individual
contributions are
deductible for the
account holder (front-
loaded); earnings and
distributions tax-free
for qualified expenses
(back-loaded); Non-
qualified distributions
subject to income tax
and 10% penalty tax;
Distributions after age
65, disability or death
not subject to 10%
penalty tax.
Rollovers from other
HSAs and Archer
MSAs not subject to
contribution limits.
Archer Medical
Savings Account
(MSA)
Self-employed, small
business owners, and
employees of small
business owners. All
participants must be
covered by a HDHP.
75% of HDHP
deductible (family);
65% of HDHP
deductible (self-only);
no more than income.
Most medical care 
and services, dental
care, and vision care.
Tax-deductible
contributions, earnings
and distributions 
tax-free for qualified
expenses (front- and
back-loaded); 15%
penalty tax for non-
qualified distributions;
Exception to penalty
tax for disabled, over
65 or death.
Sources: Internal Revenue Service, 2008a; U.S. Department of Treasury, 2007; Internal Revenue Service 2008b; Internal Revenue Service
2009a; Internal Revenue Service 2009b; Internal Revenue Service 2008c; Internal Revenue Service 2009c; Internal Revenue Service 2004.
Health Care
Tax-Favored
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Rules
Contribution
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401(K)-TYPE PLANS
The employee contribution limit established by law for 401(k)-type plans increased
from $9,500 to $10,500 between 1997 and 2000 and then again to $12,000 in 2003.75
The average contribution (in constant 1997 dollars) was $2,772 in 1997, $3,039 in
2000 and $3,257 in 2003.76 Despite the higher limits in 2003, the growth in average
real contribution was smaller between 2000 and 2003 (7.2 percent) than it was in 
the earlier period, when it grew 9.6 percent. 
TABLE A2 Average Contributions to 401(k)-Type Plans, 1997, 2000, 2003, 
by age cohort, income, and marital status, in 1997 dollars
By Age Cohort
CATEGORY 200320001997
Average Contribution (1997 dollars)
Under 30 1,592 1,873 1,710
30 to 44 2,681 2,993 3,084
45 to 59 3,466 3,590 3,917
60 and over 3,213 3,338 3,801
All Cohorts 2,772 3,039 3,257
By Income Group (1997 Dollars)
Under $20,000 546 635 636
$20,000 to $40,000 1,324 1,397 1,388
$40,000 to $80,000 2,482 2,633 2,772
$80,000 to $120,000 4,131 4,245 4,634
$120,000 to $160,000 5,360 5,706 6,553
$160,000 and over 7,054 7,019 8,330
All Income Groups 2,772 3,039 3,257
By Marital Status/Earner Role
Unmarried Earners 2,190 2,448 2,534
Married Earners
Sole 3,580 3,881 4,196
Primary 3,398 3,712 3,988
Secondary 2,239 2,501 2,722
All Earners 2,772 3,039 3,257
Nonearning Spouse n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 1997, 2000, and 2003 individual income tax
returns and tax information returns.
Notes: The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus excluded contributions to retirement plans less taxable
distributions from individual retirement accounts.
n.a. = not applicable
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The patterns of contributions among income groups, age cohorts, and household
structure also changed substantially from 2000 to 2003. Average contributions made 
to these savings plans increased with incomes in each of these years and represented
similar shares of income. These ranged from five percent of adjusted gross income in
the lower-income groups to approximately four percent in the higher income groups.
Between 1997 and 2000, the growth rate for average contributions was the highest for
the lowest-income group (under $20,000 in AGI). Their contributions went up from 
$546 to $635 in real terms, but were stagnant between 2000 and 2003. 
The higher contributions limit in 2003 allowed more higher-income earners to increase
their contributions. Earners with incomes over $160,000 increased their average
contribution by 18.6 percent between 2000 and 2003. Older cohorts also appeared 
to take advantage of the catch-up provisions to increase their contributions between
2000 and 2003. Alternatively, the real contributions of the under-30 cohort, declined
despite the higher dollar limit. Married people made higher average contributions and
had their contributions increase more than unmarried people over the 2000 to 2003
period. These differences in growth rates were not as high as among age and income groups.
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IRAs
The $2,000 contribution limit did not change between 1997 and 2000, but over 
this period the average size of real contributions by those participating did decline. 
This may be because almost two-thirds of participants were contributing $2,000 in
1997, but the real value of this amount declined by 2000 due to inflation. Still, there 
is a relatively high number of participants that contribute the maximum deductible
amounts for traditional IRAs, a feature that is more pronounced for higher-income
earners than lower-income earners. The contribution limit was raised in 2003 to $3,000
for taxpayers under the age of 50 and to $3,500 for taxpayers over the age of 50. This
created more room for higher contributions and between 2000 and 2003, the average
real contribution to IRAs increased by over 27 percent to an average of $1,926. 
TABLE A3 Average Contributions to IRAs, 1997, 2000, 2003, by age cohort, income,
and marital status, in 1997 dollars
By Age Cohort
CATEGORY
Under 30 1,407 1,378 1,493
30 to 44 1,530 1,474 1,741
45 to 59 1,675 1,564 2,122
60 and over 1,713 1,659 2,258
All Cohorts 1,593 1,512 1,926
By Income Group (1997 Dollars)
Under $20,000 1,428 1,355 1,481
$20,000 to $40,000 1,513 1,397 1,720
$40,000 to $80,000 1,520 1,486 1,912
$80,000 to $120,000 1,741 1,627 2,142
$120,000 to $160,000 1,863 1,652 2,310
$160,000 and over 1,915 1,753 2,578
All Income Groups 1,593 1,512 1,926
By Marital Status/Earner Role
Unmarried Earners 1,549 1,451 1,777
Married Earners
Sole 1,626 1,571 2,163
Primary 1,613 1,546 1,963
Secondary 1,615 1,527 1,940
All Earners 1,593 1,512 1,926
Nonearning Spouse 1,583 1,559 2,182
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 1997, 2000, and 2003 individual income tax
returns and tax information returns.
Notes: The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus excluded contributions to retirement plans less taxable
distributions from individual retirement accounts.
200320001997
Average Contribution (1997 dollars)
ECONOM IC  MOB I L I T Y  PRO JECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
46 A Penny Saved is Mobility Earned: Advancing Economic Mobility through Savings
Contributions to traditional IRAs grew substantially more (31.8 percent) than did
contributions to Roth IRAs (22.7 percent) between 2000 and 2003 when the limits
were raised. This is likely because the highest income group was previously most
constrained by the contribution limits for Traditional IRAs and they were prohibited
from contributing to Roth IRAs, which has income limits.77
Average contributions increased with age in all years, and this may have been a
reflection of the catch-up provisions which allowed those over 50 to make higher
contributions. Average real contributions varied little by marital status and earner 
role in 1997 and 2000, with unmarried earners making the lowest contributions and
married sole earners the highest. In 2000, there was a $120 difference in the average
contribution of these two groups. By 2003, that difference had increased to $386. 
Since IRA contributions limits are more restrictive than those for 401(k)s, average
contributions vary less with income for IRAs than for 401(k)-type plans.
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TABLE A4 Average Contributions to Self Employment Plans, 1997, 2000, 2003, 
by age cohort, income, and marital status, in 1997 dollars
By Age Cohort
CATEGORY
Under 30 4,675 5,137 6,557
30 to 44 8,050 7,909 10,807
45 to 59 8,211 9,093 12,829
60 and over 8,612 7,675 12,276
All Cohorts 8,115 8,405 11,995
By Income Group (1997 Dollars)
Under $20,000 2,245 1,920 2,716
$20,000 to $40,000 2,665 2,761 3,525
$40,000 to $80,000 4,098 4,027 5,534
$80,000 to $120,000 6,360 5,432 7,836
$120,000 to $160,000 9,433 8,500 11,640
$160,000 and over 14,578 14,984 21,015
All Income Groups 8,115 8,405 11,995
By Marital Status/Earner Role
Unmarried Earners 7,290 7,465 12,714
Married Earners
Sole 11,311 12,189 16,304
Primary 9,812 10,054 14,256
Secondary 2,950 3,409 4,852
All Earners 8,115 8,405 11,995
Nonearning Spouse n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 1997, 2000, and 2003 individual income tax
returns and tax information returns.
Notes: The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus excluded contributions to retirement plans less taxable
distributions from individual retirement accounts.
n.a. = not applicable.
200320001997
Average Contribution (1997 dollars)
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SELF-EMPLOYED PLANS
There are varying contribution limits for each of the three self-employed plans. 
The Simplified Employee Pensions (SEPs) was a limit of $30,000 and the Savings
Incentive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLEs) has a limit of $6,500. These did 
not increase between 1997 and 2000. Average contributions did increase during this
period by four percent to $8,405, which CBO attributed to inflation and a real growth 
in self-employment income.78 In 2003, the contribution limits were increased. The
contribution limits for SIMPLEs was increased to $8,000 and $9,000 for those over 
50 and the limits on contributions to SEPs to $40,000. The SIMPLE limit of 25
percent of earnings was increased to 100 percent and the 15 percent limit for SEPs 
was increased to 25 percent. Before these changes took effect, fewer than 10 percent 
of participants had been constrained by these limits, so the expectation was that these
changes would not lead to higher contribution amounts. However, they increased 
over 42 percent between 2000 and 2003, which was a much larger increase over 
the previous period.
Again, there is a strong correlation between contribution amounts and income. 
The higher the income of the household, the larger the contribution amounts they
made. In 1997, the average contributions for those earning between $20,000 and
$40,000 was $2,665 and this grew to $3,525 in 2003 (in 1997 dollars). However,
those with income between $120,000 and $160,000 had average contributions 
of $9,433 in 1997 which grew to $11,640 in 2003 (in 1997 dollars). 
At incomes above $20,000, average contributions were around 10 percent of 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). But unlike 401(k)-type plans and IRAs, the growth 
in average contributions to self-employed plans was higher at the low end of the income
scale (41.5 percent) than at the high end (40.2 percent). This may be because the
people most constrained by the percentage of earnings limits were concentrated at 
lower income levels. The increased levels in 2003 allowed for these people to increase
their contributions four times previous amounts. For higher earners, it is the dollar 
limit that would become binding rather than the percentage of earnings limit. 
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Under 30 2 1 51 38 56 36
30 to 44 6 6 65 55 58 44
45 to 59 8 6 73 58 70 48
60 and over 9 5 81 53 82 51
All Cohorts 6 5 70 55 62 44
Under $20,000 1 <1 50 58 58 37
$20,000 to $40,000 1 <1 56 33 50 35
$40,000 to $80,000 2 1 69 55 59 42
$80,000 to $120,000 7 6 78 71 73 54
$120,000 to $160,000 18 16 82 87 81 61
$160,000 and over 37 37 97 87 n.a. n.a.
All Income Groups 6 5 70 55 62 44
Unmarried Earners 4 3 67 49 61 44
Married Earners
Sole 12 8 70 60 69 55
Primary 8 7 72 56 61 40
Secondary 5 3 71 57 62 45
All Earners 6 5 70 55 62 44
Nonearning Spouse n.a. n.a. 72 66 72 52
TABLE A5 Percentage of Participants Contributing the Maximum 
to 401(k)-Type Plans and IRAs
IRA Roth IRA
2000 2003 2000 2003CATEGORY
401(k)
2000 2003
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2007. Tabulations of a sample of 2000 and 2003 individual income tax returns 
and tax information returns.
Notes: The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2007 increased the annual dollar and percentage-of-comparison
limits and permitted additional “catch-up” contributions by taxpayers age 50 and older. Maximum contributions include
the full “catch-up” rate. The income classifier is adjusted gross income plus excluded contributions to retirement plans less
taxable distributions from individual retirement accounts.
n.a. = not applicable.
By Income Group (1997 Dollars)
By Marital Status/Earner Role
By Age Cohort
ECONOM IC  MOB I L I T Y  PRO JECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
50 A Penny Saved is Mobility Earned: Advancing Economic Mobility through Savings
TABLE A6 Tax Benefits of Defined-Contribution Plans and IRAs, 
by Age of Household Head, 2004
Age of Household Head
Average
benefit ($)
Share of
Total
Benefits
Percent of
Tax Units
with a
Benefit
Less than 25 16.4 7.9 -316
25-34 34.3 22.9 -654
35-44 43.9 35.3 -900
45-54 43.5 24.9 -789
55-64 30.0 7.7 -384
65 3.5 1.3 -33
All 28.7 100.0 -528
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model.
Note: Average benefit refers to the present value of income taxes for each filing unit after contributions have been made.
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TABLE A7
TANF Asset Limits by State, July 2007
State Asset Limit Vehicle Exemption
Alabama $2,000/$3,000 All vehicles owned by household
Alaska $2,000/$3,000 All vehicles owned by household
Arizona $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Arkansas $3,000 One vehicle per household
California $2,000/$3,000 $4,650/One vehicle per licensed driver
Colorado $15,000 One vehicle per household
Connecticut $3,000 $9,500
Delaware $1,000 $4,650
D.C. $2,000/$3,000 All vehicles owned by household
Florida $2,000 $8,500
Georgia $1,000 $1,500/$4,650
Hawaii $5,000 All vehicles owned by household
Idaho $2,000 $4,650
Illinois $2,000/$3,000 +$50 One vehicle per household
Indiana $1,500 $5,000
Iowa $5,000 One vehicle per household
Kansas $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Kentucky $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Louisiana $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Maine $2,000 One vehicle per household
Maryland $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Massachusetts $2,500 $5,000/$10,000
Michigan $3,000 All vehicles owned by household
Minnesota $5,000 $7,500
Mississippi $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Missouri $5,000 One vehicle per household
Montana $3,000 One vehicle per household
Nebraska $4,000/$6,000 One vehicle per household
Nevada $2,000 One vehicle per household
New Hampshire $2,000 One vehicle per licensed driver
New Jersey $2,000 $11,500
New Mexico $3,500 All vehicles owned by household
New York $2,000/$3,000 $4,650/$9,300
North Carolina $3,000 One vehicle per adult
North Dakota $3,000/$6,000/+$25 One vehicle per household
Ohio No limit All vehicles owned by household
Oklahoma $1,000 $5,000
Oregon $10,000 $10,000
Pennsylvania $1,000 One vehicle per household
Rhode Island $1,000 One vehicle per adult
South Carolina $2,500 One vehicle per licensed driver
South Dakota $2,000 One vehicle per household
Tennessee $2,000 $4,600
Texas $1,000 $4,650 of all vehicles owned by household
Utah $2,000 All vehicles owned by household
Vermont $1,000 One vehicle per adult
Virginia No limit All vehicles owned by household
Washington $1,000 $5,000
West Virginia $2,000 One vehicle per household
Wisconsin $2,500 $10,000
Wyoming $2,500 $15,000
Sources: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model; 2009 Welfare Rules Database. Urban Institute.
Note: Average benefit refers to the present value of income taxes for each filing unit after contributions have been made.
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TABLE A8
Treatment of Various Assets in Select Public Assistance Programs
Owner Occupied Home Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Vehicles Varies by state. Many states
exclude at least one vehicle
per household. Some states
set a limit on equity or fair
market value as low as
$4,650
Varies by state: most states
exclude at least one vehicle
per driver
Excludes one vehicle,
regardless of value, if it is
used for transportation a
member of your household
Varies by state and
category. Usually some
amount of equity or value
in a vehicle is not counted.
Defined Contribution
Plans (401ks, 403bs,
IRAs, etc.)
Varies by state. Some 
states exclude all retirement
accounts. Some count all
retirement accounts
Excluded (as of enactment
of 2008 Farm Bill)
Counted, unless
specifically excluded 
by the state
Treatment of:
Retirement:
Temporary
Assistance for
Needy Families
(TANF)
SNAP 
(Food Stamps)
Supplemental
Security Income
(SSI)
Medicaid/SCHIP
(for working
families)
Defined Benefit 
(Pension) Plans
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
EITC Varies by state. Some states
exclude EITC for one year
after receipt. Others only
for month after receipt.
Excluded for 12 months
after receipt
Excluded for 9 months. Varies by state. See
“Defined Benefit Plans.”
Life Insurance Excludes policies with 
a combined face value 
of $1,500 or less.
Varies by state. See
“Defined Benefit Plans.”
Savings Bonds Count Count Count Varies by state. See
“Defined Benefit Plans.”
Other Assets:
College Savings Accounts
(529s, Coverdells)
Varies by state. Excluded (as of enactment
of 2008 Farm Bill)
Count Varies by state. See
“Defined Benefit Plans.”
Sources: Social Security Administration, 2009; Parent, 2006.
Notes: SNAP and TANF: The 2002 Farm Bill allows states to streamline eligibility between the SNAP and TANF cash assistance programs. Recognizing that the income
eligibility threshold for TANF in every state is lower than the income eligibility threshold for SNAP, states now have the option to consider anyone who receives TANF
categorically eligible for SNAP assistance. States have used this authority to extend SNAP benefits to individuals who receive TANF cash assistance and also individuals
who receive a “TANF funded benefit.” This has enabled states to use their own discretion and set their own asset tests in qualifying applicants for SNAP assistance.
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OTHER PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Housing Choice Voucher Program: Eligibility for this program is set at the federal 
level. There are no set asset limits for housing programs per se, but for families with
assets over $5,000, a modest amount of interest is assumed and added to their income
to determine eligibility.
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP): States have the option 
to apply asset rules. Currently 11 states have asset tests for eligibility, ranging from
$1,500 to $15,500 per household.
Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG): States have the option to apply
asset rules, but vehicles must be excluded. States have the option to employ an asset
limit. No compilation of asset tests by state is available for this program.
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REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF RECENT QUANTITATIVE STUDIES
Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), James
Sullivan (2004) finds that the asset limit on vehicles in TANF has a significant effect 
on whether low-educated single mothers own a car. Exploiting state variation in the
treatment of vehicles for eligibility determination, Sullivan concludes that moving 
from a $1,500 vehicle exemption to a full vehicle exemption results in a 20 percent
increase in the probability of car ownership. Sullivan, however, finds no evidence that
asset limits affect the liquid asset holdings of low-educated, single mothers. Economists
Hurst and Ziliak (2004) conducted a similar analysis using data from the PSID, with
FIGURE A1
Program Layering: Percent of Program Recipients Receiving Additional Assistance 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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the same results: asset tests do affect the probability of car ownership but have no effect
on the liquid asset holdings of single mothers. This lack of empirical evidence leads the
authors to make bold conclusions about the effect of asset tests, asserting that most
welfare recipients report asset holdings too low to be affected by current asset limit
thresholds. If there exists a propensity and ability for precautionary saving, they argue, 
we should see an increase in the liquid assets of households in states that have
liberalized the asset test in TANF post welfare reform. 
Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) conducted a similar analysis but instead focused on
Medicaid. Using data from the SIPP, the authors demonstrate that the asset test in the
Medicaid program actually has a large and statistically significant negative effect on the
asset holdings of eligible low-income households. The authors analyzed household data
from 1984 to 1993, a period when many states phased out their asset tests for Medicaid
eligibility. Exploiting state variation in the asset test for Medicaid eligibility, Gruber and
Yelowitz find that the interaction of an expansion of eligibility with the presence of an
asset test “more than doubles the wealth reduction attributable to expanding Medicaid
eligibility.”79 The authors posit this finding supports the argument that individuals who
are newly eligible for assistance under the income test may “spend down” their wealth
in order to qualify under the asset test. 
Extending the analysis conducted by Gruber and Yelowitz, Maynard and Qui 
(2007) find that the effect of Medicaid eligibility—both with and without an asset
test—on asset holdings varies by household wealth. They demonstrate that Medicaid
eligibility—regardless of the specific asset limit—puts the greatest downward pressure
on the holdings of families in the middle wealth deciles, with little to no effect on
families in the very bottom or top of the wealth (or income) distribution. In looking 
at the effect of asset limits specifically, the authors find a similar pattern, noting that
the effect is strongest for the lower-middle quintiles: families whose asset holdings are
just above the asset test threshold for eligibility. These families have a strong incentive
to “spend down” their assets in order to qualify for assistance. Higher-wealth families 
are presumably less willing to spend down their high wealth in order to qualify 
for assistance (and to be sure are likely covered by some form of private insurance). 
Lower-wealth families, they conclude, have too little in the way of assets to be 
affected by the limit.
On first glance it appears that the findings of Gruber and Yelowitz and Maynard and
Qui—that asset limits negatively affect the asset holdings of low-wealth families—contradict
those of Sullivan and Hurst and Ziliak (2004), who find no such evidence and therefore
conclude no effect. The disparities between these research projects can be accounted 
for by considering how the eligibility rules for multiple programs interact to affect 
the savings and wealth accumulation of low-income households.
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Each of these studies fails to appreciate that many low-income families receive
assistance from more than one program, and the number of programs an individual 
is eligible for—and likely receives benefits from—increases as household income
decreases. Consider, for example, a family who receives TANF cash assistance. Although
the income eligibility threshold for TANF varies by state, even in the most generous
states a family of three can earn no more than about $17,000 a year and still be eligible
for assistance.80 However, the income eligibility threshold for SNAP is set by the federal
government at 130 percent of the federal poverty line, which in 2009 is $23,803 for a
family of 3. Therefore, with few exceptions, every family in the United States who is
income eligible for TANF cash assistance is also income eligible for SNAP assistance. 
In fact, data from the 2004 SIPP reveals that 85.7 percent of individuals who receive
TANF also receive SNAP. 
A family who receives TANF is likely to receive SNAP and is therefore subject to the
SNAP asset limit of $2,000, which does not vary by state. Even if states use their authority
to eliminate the asset limit in TANF, these households are still covered by the $2,000
SNAP asset limit. This “layering” of program eligibility requirements results in the most
restrictive asset test serving as the de facto governing threshold. It is no surprise, then,
that eliminating the asset limit in the TANF program alone—as Virginia and Ohio
have—has little effect on the asset holdings of program recipients. Since the SNAP 
asset test has remained unchanged at $2,000, the only potential variation in the “de
facto” asset limit is for TANF recipients in states that raised their limit from $1,000 
to $2,000 and above. But this too overestimates the real change on the ground, as
many states that increased the asset limit for TANF to $2,000 and above left their
Medicaid limit unchanged at $1,000 for much of the period analyzed by Sullivan 
and Hurst and Ziliak.81 It is no surprise, then, that Sullivan and Hurst and Ziliak 
found no effect—much of the variation in program rules that provided the conditions
for their “natural experiment” did not exist on the ground; regardless of changes in the
TANF program, the de facto asset limit for many families changed very little, if at all. 
The layering effect also explains Maynard and Qui’s finding that the downward
pressure of the asset limit in Medicaid on asset accumulation follows a “u-shaped”
curve across the wealth spectrum, with very low- and high-wealth families experiencing
little downward pressure, whereas middle-wealth families experience a much stronger
saving disincentive. The income eligibility threshold for Medicaid assistance is the
highest of any of the major public assistance programs, including TANF and SNAP. 
It stands to reason then, that many families who are income eligible for Medicaid
assistance earn too much to qualify for TANF or SNAP assistance. Indeed, analysis 
of 2004 SIPP data reveals that only 40.5 percent of Medicaid recipients also receive
SNAP assistance. 
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Fully 50 percent of individuals on Medicaid do not receive assistance from any other
major public assistance program—TANF, SNAP or SSI. These families are subject 
to no other program eligibility guidelines and are therefore wholly sensitive to changes 
in the Medicaid program, which is why these “middle-wealth” families responded
strongly to variations in the asset limit in Maynard and Qui’s analysis. The lower-income
families, the 50 percent who, in addition to Medicaid receive assistance from SNAP,
TANF, and/or SSI, are consequently not as sensitive to variations in the Medicaid 
asset test as they are still subject to asset limit rules in those programs.82
This layering effect explains why both Sullivan (2004) and Hurst and Ziliak (2004)
found a relationship between asset limits in the TANF program and car ownership, 
as many states who liberalized their car rules in the TANF and Medicaid programs 
also exercised an option granted to them under the SNAP program to liberalize the
treatment of vehicles in that program. 
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1 Brobeck, 2008.
2 A transaction account is a deposit account from which holders can withdraw funds or make transfers
to third parties. 
3 A future Economic Mobility Project technical report will examine differences in savings, income, and
consumption mobility, including separate analyses for blacks and whites. It will include analyses of
intergenerational elasticities as well as the transition matrices presented here.
4 Isaacs, Haskins, and Sawhill, 2007.
5 The PSID is a nationally representative, longitudinal survey of households and their offspring that
began in 1968. The survey was conducted annually between 1968 and 1997 and has been collected
biennially since 1997. The survey includes an initial over-sampling of low-income households (poverty
sample) as well as the addition of an immigrant sample in the 1990s. We include all households whether
or not they are in the immigrant or poverty sample. We do this to maintain adequate sample size for our
analysis, especially the intergenerational results. The survey includes longitudinal weights to account for
this oversampling, which we use when calculating summary statistics. We restrict our final sample to
include only household heads. All economic measures are reported in 2000 dollars. These data are
adjusted for inflation using the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator from the National Income
and Product Accounts.
6 “Other real estate” includes any investment property other than a household’s primary residence. Non-
collateralized debt includes credit card debt, college loans, and other debt without pledged assets as
collateral. 
7 The measure of savings includes households other real estate holdings. The results are virtually
identical when other real estate is excluded from the savings measure since a very limited number of
households have such assets.
8 In particular, we regress income on successive 5-year indicator variables for household age and then
use the respective residuals for our conditional analysis. The indicators variables are for households 
25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39 and so on. A given indicator takes a value of 1 if the household’s age falls
within the specified range and is zero otherwise. In the intergenerational analyses, average age in the
parent generation was 51 (ranging from 22 to 87) while in the child generation it was 41 (ranging from
17 to 79). In the intra-generational analyses, average age was 50 in 1989, ranging from 22 to 98.
9 Averaging income reduces measurement error and is important for obtaining unbiased results (Solon,
1992).
10 Cramer and Siu, 2009.
11 Each of these policies is described as tax expenditure for budget purposes to account for revenue losses.
12 Hungerford, 2006.
13 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005).
14 Each of these vehicles represents a form of savings incentive created by public policy and embedded in
the tax code. Although these accounts and savings plans are associated with different primary purposes,
such as retirement, education, and health care, with their various rules they create opportunities to use
funds for other purposes as well. The largest number of vehicles are associated with retirement and these
include IRAs (both Roth and Traditional), 401(k)-type plans sponsored by employers (different ones for
private employers, government, and nonprofit entities), and Keough plans for the self-employed. Savings
incentives for education are delivered through individual Coverdell Savings Accounts and state-run 529
College Savings Plans. Savings for health care can be accumulated in Health Savings Accounts
(originally piloted as Archer Medical Savings Accounts). 
15 This paper is focused on tax incentives for personal savings. This excludes tax incentives to build 
other types of assets or compensate for expenditures like the First-Time Homebuyer Credit or Flexible
Spending Arrangements. It also excludes tax savings on interest gained from life insurance plans. 
NOTES
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16 Some savings that are invested in non tax-favored accounts also receive preferential tax treatment;
profits from long-term investments in capital assets, such as stocks, bonds, or real estate are currently
taxed at a lower rate than income. The rationale for treating capital gains distinctly from income is
intended to promote capital investments and funding for entrepreneurial activity, but it has been a
subject of ongoing policy debate.
17 Hungerford, 2006. 
18 Contributions to IRAs are restricted for persons with adjusted gross annual incomes of more than
$105,000 as an individual, or $166,000 as a couple, and barred altogether if income is more than
$120,000 singly or $176,000 with a spouse.
19 Despite the range of savings incentives created by the tax code, this analysis will focus on those
primarily associated with retirement. These are the ones that are most pervasive and costly in terms 
of federal resources as well as the ones for which the greatest amount of data is available. This paper
relies most heavily on data presented by the Congressional Budget Office, Office of Management and
Budget, Tax Policy Center, and the Employee Benefit Research Institute.
20 There are limitations on higher-income households’ participation in some accounts, such as IRAs, but
these individuals usually have access to other savings vehicles, such as 401(k) plans. For 401(k) plans
there are other limits that restrict contributions made on behalf of employees. Annual contributions,
including elective deferrals and employer contributions, cannot exceed the 100 percent of compensation
or $46,000 in 2009. Also, the amount of contribution that can be considered when determining
employer and employee contributions is limited to $245,000 for 2009.
21 There are a range of methodological challenges inherent in measuring participation and calculating
contribution rates accurately. Congressional Budget Office (2007) provides a thorough description of
these issues, which include sampling error. The IRS data used for this analysis is a representative sample
of tax filers. Burman et al. (2004) offers additional insights, particularly how the inclusion of non-tax
filers can change participation estimates. The CBO sample focused on tax filing workers. Participation
consists of contributing to an individual retirement account, self-employed plan, or 401(k)-type plan 
or being enrolled in a noncontributory plan during the given year.
22 The Economic Growth and Tax relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) increased the annual
dollar and percentage of compensation limits on contributions to tax–favored accounts and permitted
additional “catch-up” contributions by taxpayers over the age of 50.
23 This calculation is based on an estimate of 133.4 million tax filing workers. Participation includes
both defined-contribution and defined-benefit (traditional pension) arrangements.
24 In other analysis, Employee Benefit Research Institute (2006) has calculated a “sponsored
participation rate” which is defined by the fraction of workers participating in a plan among those
whose employers or unions sponsor a plan for any employees. Their estimate of participation for 2003
(50.9 percent) is similar to CBO’s with an overall sponsored participation rate of 75.6 percent. However,
for earners with incomes over $50,000, the sponsored participation rate is 91.7 percent and is close to
50 percent for those earning less than $20,000.
25 An additional finding of the CBO analysis was that the participation rates had remained relatively
stable since 1997. They did decline slightly, from 51 percent in 1997 to 50 percent in 2000, but were
unchanged through 2003. The decline in participation was largest among those under age 30, although
even they experienced only a small decline. During these years, there were small increases in
participation by older households and households with higher incomes.
26 Employee Benefit Research Institute (2006). 
27 Ibid.
28 Employer contributions were excluded from the analysis. Contributions to retirement plans do not
necessarily represent new savings since they could be drawn from existing assets. Contribution levels 
are influenced by governing rules, which vary by account type. For example, 401(k)-type plans have
higher contribution limits than IRAs, which partly explains why they have higher contribution levels.
See the appendix for a presentation and analysis of contribution amounts in 1997, 2000, and 2003 
by account type.
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29 Carasso, Reynolds and Steuerle, 2007.
30 See Burman et al., 2004, page 4 for a full description of data and simulation techniques. These
include use of 1999 IRS data and Current Population Survey data to capture nonfilers, an aging and
extrapolation process, and a set of assumptions to calculate future tax incidence.
31 Burman et al., 2004, page 9. Also, this analysis presents the model results in terms of “cash income,”
as opposed to adjusted gross income. Cash income includes wages and salaries, interest income, taxable
dividends, and other categories of income. In this sense, it provides a more accurate reflection of
economic status.
32 This analysis also focused on how different cohort age groups benefit from current policy, and found
that the amount of tax benefits also vary by age. (See also Table A6 in the Appendix.) One factor is 
that younger people have more years ahead of them, and therefore potentially stand more to gain from 
a deferral of tax liabilities. Yet younger workers typically have less income available for them to save.
Working in their 40s and 50s, by contrast, typically have fewer years ahead of them, but have more
income available to defer, are subject to higher tax rates, and also have a higher probability of working
for an employer who offers a savings plan. All told, the tax benefits for saving in these vehicles are worth
most to workers between age 35 and 54 (see Burman et al, (2004) page 12). The present value of these
benefits in 2004 averaged approximately $900 for households with a head between age 35 and 44, and
close to $800 for those between 45 and 54. These figures, however, mask an important reality: At any
age, likelihood of participation and of making contributions grew steadily with income. 
33 Tax Policy Center estimates of participation and contributions were performed at the household level
(tax unit) as opposed to CBO’s approach focusing on workers. Consequently, CBO’s participation rates
were somewhat higher but broadly consistent with the TPC estimates. 
34 Burman et al., 2004, page 11.
35 Hungerford, 2006; Hubbard and Skinner, 1996.
36 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005).
37 Enger and Gale, 2000.
38 Benjamin, 2001.
39 Shreiner et al., 2002.
40 Shreiner et al., 2002.
41 Participation in defined-contribution 401(k)-type plans has increased (from 27 to 29 percent) 
between 1997 and 2003, while participation in defined-benefit pensions declined over the same period
(from 20 to 17 percent). If other defined-contribution accounts, such as IRAs and self-employment
plans, are included, participation did not exceed 37 percent for all workers in 2003.
42 Madrian and Shea, 2001.
43 Cramer and Sui, 2009.
44 One notable exception to the home exemption is for institutionalized elderly under Medicaid. 
The home is counted as a nonexempt asset if the individual stays in the nursing home for a period 
of longer than six months and no spouse or dependant children are living in the home.
45 For a state by state breakdown of state treatment of retirement and other restricted accounts in
determining eligibility for TANF and Medicaid/SCHIP, see Resource Guide; Lifting Asset Limits in
Public Benefit Programs. CFED (2009).
http://scorecard.cfed.org/downloads/pdfs/resource_guides/rg_AssetLimits.pdf. See also the Welfare
Rules Database, 2009.
46 States have also used an option known as “categorical eligibility” to waive the asset limit in SNAP 
for any households who receive a TANF-funded benefit. A number of states have exercised this option 
to effectively liberalize the asset limit in SNAP.
47 For a discussion of how asset limits discourage saving and a review of existing research, see McDonald,
Gordon, Peter Orszag and Gina Russell, “The Effect of Asset Tests on Saving,” Retirement Security
Project, www.retirementsecurityproject.org
48 O’Brien, 2008.
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49 Elderly persons in a nursing home or other institutional setting are subject to a particular asset 
limit for long-term care under Medicaid. As this assistance is typically provided for end of life care, 
the principles and motivations for reform outlined in this report—self-sufficiency and economic
security—are not strictly applicable. Liberalizing the asset limit for this population, for example, 
would directly increase the amount of wealth available for inheritance, raising a number of important
questions regarding equity and the role of public policy. 
50 Individuals under 65 who qualify for SSI are currently required to apply for periodic payments from
their retirement accounts in order to qualify for assistance. Alongside exclusion of retirement savings,
this requirement would also need to be eliminated. See Neuberger and Greenstein (2008) for a detailed
discussion of why retirement savings by working aged persons with disabilities should be excluded from
eligibility considerations for SSI. 
51 Ong, 2002; Lucas and Nicholson, 2002; Raphael and Rice, 2002.
52 Richards and Bruce, 2004. 
53 See Chapter One.
54 Orszag, 2005.
55 Axinn et al., 1997; Nam and Huang, 2008; Zhan and Sherraden, 2003; Conley, 2001; 
Nam and Huang, 2008.
56 Schreiner et al, 2001.
57 Of note, another problem associated with low take-up rates is when employers fail to provide
necessary financial education to understand the intricacies and value of the tax-favored account as a
compensation benefit. When employers assume the task of explaining this complexity to their employees,
it amounts to a cost of business that some employers choose to avoid; a situation which reveals the
promise and peril of relying on the employment relationship to facilitate savings.
58 The New America Foundation has supported the development of a targeted savings incentive called
the Saver’s Bonus, which would reward low- and moderate-income individuals and families who save at
tax time. (See Newville, 2009.) Deposits made in designated savings products would be matched with an
additional dollar from the federal government, up to a $500 annual maximum. Participants would make
or report contributions to an eligible account on their federal income tax return, and the bonus would
then be transferred directly to the designated account. 
59 Burmann et al., 2004, Table 8.
60 Some states employ different asset limits for applicants and current recipients under TANF. 
In addition to the administrative complexity and confusion of implementing two limits for one program,
this policy still requires that low-income families spend down nearly all of their assets in order to qualify
for assistance, leaving them more vulnerable to future income shocks, less likely to achieve self-sufficiency,
and likely to spend more time on public assistance.
61 This reform recommendation is more restrictive than current policy under the 2008 Food, Conservation
and Energy Act (Farm Bill) which excludes all money in retirement savings accounts when determining
any household’s eligibility for SNAP, including elderly households. If this proposal is adopted in concert
with the suggested changes to SSI for working age persons detailed above, a potential eligibility “cliff”
would appear at age 65. Working age persons on SSI who save for retirement in excluded vehicles
(401(k), IRA, etc.) would be required to spend down their retirement savings to under $10,000 
(or total combined retirement and non-retirement liquid assets to less than $20,000) in order to
continue eligibility for SSI.
62 Neuberger and Greenstein of the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities recommend disregarding 
one-third of money withdrawn from retirement accounts when calculating household income and
determining benefits for SSI. This proposal “treats senior’s retirement savings more generously than
other unearned income, but less favorably than earned income, by reducing SSI benefits by $2 for 
each $3 in such payments.” Neuberger and Greenstein, 2008, page 5.
63 For example, see Center for American Progress, 2007, page 51.
64 Sherraden and Sherraden, 2000.
65 Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill).
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66 Ibid.
67 IDAs funded all or in part by TANF/MOE or Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) moneys are already
excluded. Exclusion should be extended to all IDAs funded and defined in federal law, including Office
of Refugee Resettlement and Beginning Farm and Rancher IDA programs.
68 Streamlining the asset verification process can reduce the administrative burden on caseworkers and
thereby save government money; after eliminating the asset limit in TANF, the state of Virginia reported
administrative cost savings of $400,000 a year. 
69 Survey of Consumer Finances 2007
70 Seidman, Hababou, Kramer, 2005. For a discussion of the direct financial costs of being unbanked,
see Desmond and Sprenger, 2007. 
71 The Obama administration has proposed the establishment of a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency that will be tasked with developing “plain vanilla” banking products for consumers. 
72 Those who completed the financial education provided through the Financial Links for Low-Income
People (FLLIP) program in Illinois were more likely to use and balance a household budget, take
advantage of employer sponsored retirement benefits and save using formal bank accounts. 
73 Some have called for the creation of a volunteer “financial services corps” of financial planning
professionals who would go in to low-income communities and offer families one-on-one financial
counseling at no cost. 
74 A High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP) has a higher annual deductible than typical health plans, and
a maximum limit on the total deductible and out-of-pocket covered medical expenses (e.g. co-payments)
paid out per year.
75 There was a 25-percent-of-compensation limit on contributions in 1997 and 2000, which was
increased to 100 percent for 2003. Also in 2003, taxpayers age 50 and over were allowed to make
catch-up contributions of $2,000 above the limit for other taxpayers.
76 All figures are in 1997 dollars to facilitate comparison.
77 With both types of IRAs, growth in contributions was lower in the highest eligible income group than
in the one right below it. Growth in contributions to traditional IRAs ranged from 15.2 percent in the
lowest income group to 53.4 percent in the $120,000 to $160,000 group, before dropping to 46.8
percent in the highest income group. Growth in contributions to Roth IRAs ranged from 3.0 percent 
in the lowest income group to 31.0 percent in the $80,000 to $120,000 group, and dropping to 30.2
percent in the $120,000-$160,000 group.
78 Congressional Budget Office, 2007, page 14.
79 Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999, page 1270.
80 National Center for Children in Poverty, 2009.
81 As of July 2000, the following states employed an asset limit of $1,000 in determining Medicaid
eligibility: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Virginia, Washington
West Virginia and Wisconsin. See “Eliminating the Medicaid Asset Test for Families: A Review of State
Experiences,” Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Kaiser Family Foundation, 2001.
82 Maynard and Qui briefly acknowledge that eligibility for other public assistance programs may
account for why very low-wealth households are not responsive to a change in the Medicaid asset test
(27) but appear to align more with Ziliak in arguing that these households have assets too low to
respond to changes in the test.
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